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Abstract
Laeven aims to provide guidelines for the pricing of  underpriced  in many countries around the world,
deposit insurance  in different countries.  He presents  notably in several developing  countries.  More important,
several  methodologies that can be used to set  his estimates  suggest that many countries cannot afford
benchmarks for the pricing level of deposit insurance in a  deposit insurance.
country, and quantifies  how specific design  features  Deposit insurance  is unlikely to be  a viable option  in a
affect the cost of deposit  insurance.  country with weak banks and institutions.  The author
The author makes several contributions  to our  does not recommend  a funded deposit insurance scheme,
understanding  of what drives the price of deposit  but rather  he argues that for countries that have  adopted
insurance.  For example, he  shows how risk  or are adopting  deposit insurance and have decided to
diversification  and risk differentiation  within a deposit  pre-fund  it,  pricing it as accurately  as possible is
insurance system can  reduce the  price of deposit  important.
insurance.  Laeven also finds that deposit  insurance is
This paper-a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department-is part of a larger effort in the department
to study the costs and benefits of deposit insurance.  Copies of the paper are available  free from the World Bank, 1818 H
Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  contact  Rose Vo, room MC9-624,  telephone  202-473-3722,  fax 202-522-
2031,  email  address  hvol@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://
econ.worldbank.org.  The author may be contacted  at llaeven@worldbank.org.  July  2002. (69 pages)
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papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this
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Introduction
Recently,  many countries have  implemented  deposit insurance  schemes  and many more
countries  are planning to do so. The design of this part of the financial  safety net differs
across countries,  especially in account coverage.  Countries that introduce explicit deposit
insurance  make  many  decisions:  which  classes  of deposits  to  insure  and  up  to  what
amount,  which  banks  should  participate,  who  should  manage  and  own  the  deposit
insurance  fund,  and at what levels premiums  should be set.  When countries  elect not to
introduce  explicit  deposit  insurance,  insurance  is  implicit.  In  either  case,  the  benefits
banks gain depend on how effective the government is at managing bank risk-shifting.
Explicit  deposit insurance  schemes  appeal  increasingly  to  policymakers.  First,  an
explicit  scheme  supposedly sets  the rules of the  game  regarding coverage,  participants,
and  funding.  Second,  an  explicit  scheme  is appealing  to  politicians  because  it protects
small  depositors  without  immediate  impact  on  the  government  budget.  One  should,
however,  not ignore the potential cost of deposit insurance.  Deposit insurance reduces the
incentives  for  (large)  depositors  to  exert  market  discipline  on  banks,  and  encourages
banks to  take on risk.  This  form  of moral hazard has  received  a lot of attention  in the
deposit insurance  literature.2
In this  paper,  we  investigate  how  different  design  features  of deposit  insurance
schemes  affect  the price of deposit  insurance.  The goals of the paper  are twofold:  (i)  to
present several methodologies  that can be used to set benchmarks  for the pricing level of
deposit insurance  in a country; and (ii) to quantify how specific design features affect the
price of deposit insurance.
Throughout  the paper  we  refer  to  the  funding  of deposit  insurance  as the  actual
contributions  by banks to cover  deposits  and to  the pricing  of deposit  insurance  as the
actuarially fair price of deposit insurance.  Actual contributions can be made on an ex-ante
2  Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) model the incentives by which deposit insurance invites insured banks to
seek excessive portfolio risk and keep lower liquid reserves  relative to the social optimum. An overview of
the economics of deposit insurance  is provided by Bhattacharya, Boot, and Thakor (1998).
2basis,  in which case contributions  are typically  accumulated towards a deposit insurance
fund  or  reserve,  or on  an  ex-post  basis,  in  which  case  banks  pay  deposit  insurance
premiums  or  levies  only after bank  failures  occur.  Actual  contributions  by banks  can
differ  substantially  from estimates  of the  actuarially  fair price  of deposit  insurance  for
several reasons. First, deposit insurance can be over- or underpriced.  Second, the estimate
of the  fair  price  of  deposit  insurance  may  be  biased.  Third,  the  government  may
contribute  funds  or  issue  guarantees  on  certain  bank  liabilities.  And  fourth,  actual
contributions  are not always  smoothed over time, unlike fair premiums that are typically
calculated  as annual  annuities.  For instance,  many countries  establish  target fund levels.
Once  the  fund  achieves  its  target  level,  contributions  may  be  (close  to)  zero.  Also,
countries may decide to set contributions high initially in order to quickly reach a certain
minimum fund size.
The  academic  foundations  for  measuring  the  value  of deposit  insurance  lie  in
Merton (1977),  who models deposit insurance  as a put option on the value of the bank's
assets.  Most of the  empirical  literature  on deposit  insurance  has  either  focused  on  the
issue  of over-  or underpricing  of deposit  insurance  or  on how different  design features
affect  the  effectiveness  of  deposit  insurance.  No  study  thus  far  has  systematically
investigated  how the different  design  features  affect the value of deposit insurance,  and
therefore its pricing.
In  countries  with  explicit  deposit  insurance,  deposit  insurance  is  underpriced
(overpriced)  if the deposit insurer actually  charges less (more)  for its services  than the
estimated  opportunity-cost  value  of these  services.  Underpricing  of deposit  insurance
services  is  a  sign  that  banks  extract  deposit-insurance  subsidies.  Marcus  and  Shaked
(1984)  use  Merton's  (1977)  theoretical  model  of deposit  insurance  to  estimate  the
actuarially "fair"  value of deposit insurance.  By comparing these implicit premiums with
the  official  insurance  premiums  for  US  banks  they  test  empirically  whether  deposit
insurance is over- or underpriced.3
3 Duan and Yu (1994) find that Taiwanese deposit-taking institutions were heavily subsidized by the
deposit insurance fund of Taiwan during the period 1985 to 1992. Fries, Mason and Perraudin (1993)  find
that Japanese institutions were heavily subsidized by the deposit insurer during the period  1975 to 1992.
Hovakimian and Kane (2000) find that US banks shifted risk onto the safety net during the period  1985 to
1994, despite regulatory efforts to use capital requirements to control risk-shifting. Kaplan (2002) finds that
Thai banks received implicit deposit insurance subsidies from the government during the years prior to the
3The  effectiveness  of deposit  insurance  has  been  shown  to  be  country-specific.
Demirguc-Kunt  and  Huizinga  (1999)  offer  empirical  evidence  that  explicit  deposit
insurance  introduces  a trade-off between  the benefits  of increased  depositor  safety and
the  costs  of reduced  creditor  discipline.  Demirgiuc-Kunt  and  Detragiache  (1999)  find
cross-country  evidence  that  explicit  deposit  insurance  increases  the  probability  of
banking crises in countries  with weak institutional environments.  Cull, Senbet and Sorge
(2000)  argue  that the  introduction  of an  explicit  deposit  insurance  scheme  should  be
accompanied  by  a sound regulatory  scheme  to  deter instability  and encourage  financial
development.  Kane  (2000)  argues  that  the  design  of a  country's  financial  safety  net
should  take  country-specific  factors  into  account,  in  particular  differences  in
informational  environments  and  the enforceability  of private contracts.  Demirguc-Kunt
and Kane (2002) argue that explicit deposit insurance should not be adopted in countries
with  a  weak  institutional  environment.  This  literature  also  argues  against  pre-funding
deposit  insurance  in  a  weak  institutional  environment,  as  the  evidence  suggests  that
losses  will  be  high  in this  case.  In  countries  with  weak  institutions,  these  funds  can
literally be looted. The present paper does not challenge this view, but rather  argues that
for countries that have adopted or are adopting deposit insurance and have decided to pre-
fund it, pricing it as accurately as possible is important. Consistent with this literature, we
find that many countries  cannot afford fairly priced deposit insured.
Laeven  (2002b)  investigates  how  country-specific  and  bank-specific  features
contribute  to  the  opportunity-cost  value  of deposit  insurance  services,  with  a  special
focus  on  the comparison  of the  opportunity-cost  value  of deposit  insurance  services  in
countries with explicit deposit insurance  and countries without explicit deposit insurance.
Laeven  (2002b)  finds  that  the  opportunity-cost  value  of deposit insurance  services  is
higher  in countries  with explicit  deposit  insurance.  The detrimental  impact of explicit
deposit insurance is largely offset in countries  with high-quality and well-enforced  legal
systems,  and  the  value  of deposit  insurance  is  found  to  be  higher  for  banks  with
concentrated  ownership.  Hovakimian,  Kane  and  Laeven  (2002)  investigate  the
financial crisis in 1997. Laeven (2002a) interprets the estimate of the opportunity-cost value of deposit
insurance services  as a  proxy for bank risk and shows that this proxy has predictive power in forecasting
bank distress. He also finds that this measure of bank risk is higher for banks with concentrated ownership
and high credit growth, and for small banks.
4effectiveness of private and governmental  controls on bank risk-shifting incentives across
a large sample of countries.  Their results show that significant portions of the variation in
the effectiveness of risk control are explained by differences in contracting environments.
On  balance,  explicit  deposit  insurance  expands  risk-shifting  opportunities  in  poor
contracting  environments,  but this  effect  is reduced  in systems that impose  appropriate
combinations  of loss-sharing  rules,  risk-sensitive  premiums,  and  coverage  limits.  They
also find that recent  adopters of explicit insurance  have  done a particularly poor job of
replacing the private discipline that explicit insurance  displaced.
The paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  1 describes  several  methods  to price  the
value of deposit insurance.  Section 2 presents  several examples  and case-studies  on how
different  design  features  of  deposit  insurance  affect  its  pricing  structure.  Section  3
investigates  whether  deposit  insurance  is  underpriced  around  the  world.  Section  4
summarizes  our findings,. translates  some of our findings  in  good practices  for deposit
insurance,  and concludes.
1. Deposit Insurance Pricing Methods
Several methods exist to price deposit insurance.  Central to any deposit insurance pricing
method  is a methodology to estimate the risk of the value of a bank's assets. To estimate
bank risk and set deposit insurance premiums, regulators typically use (a combination of)
qualitative  indicators collected from on-site and off-site bank examinations,  together with
accounting-based  indicators, such as CAMEL-type indicators.
In the academic  literature, several methods have been developed that make use of
market-based  indicators.  Most  of these  methods  are based  on  Merton  (1977)'s  option-
pricing  model  that models  deposit  insurance  as  a put option on the  bank's assets.  This
model  is attractive  from  an academic point of view, because  it is based on a theoretical
framework  that  establishes  a  direct  link  between  the  value  of the  deposit  insurance
contract and the value of the bank's assets, and because it uses the market's assessment of
the value of the bank's equity and assets rather than accounting  values. The basic model
in  Merton  (1977)  has  been  extended  by  several  authors  to  include  different  design
features  of the deposit  insurance  contract  and to  deal with  several  practical  estimation
5problems  when  implementing  the  model.  We will discuss  each  of these  models in the
following section.
Another  approach  of  pricing  deposit  insurance  is  known  as  "expected  loss
pricing".  This approach  is  centered  around  the expected  default probability  of a bank,
which can be estimated using fundamental  analysis and/or market analysis. Fundamental
analysis  is  typically  based  on  CAMEL-type  ratings,  and  thus  on  accounting  values.
Market  analysis is typically based on interest rates or yields of uninsured bank debt, such
as  certificates  of  deposits  (CDs),  inter-bank  deposits,  subordinated  debt,  and/or
debentures.
If markets are  efficient,  market prices  reflect  their true value,  meaning  that all
relevant and ascertainable  information is reflected in asset prices.4 Therefore,  in countries
with  well-developed  capital  markets,  market-based  models  are  to  be  preferred  over
accounting-based  models of deposit insurance. However, the application of market-based
models  of  deposit  insurance  is  limited.  First,  market-based  models  may  give  poor
estimates  of  asset  risk  in  countries  with  underdeveloped  (illiquid)  capital  markets.
Second,  market-based  information  is not  available  for all  banks.  For  example,  market
value of equity are only available for listed banks, and debenture yields are available only
for banks  that have  issued debentures.  For these  reasons,  practical  models  of pricing
deposit insurance typically embed both market-based  and accounting-based  information.
In  the  next  sections,  we  introduce  the Merton  (1977)  option-pricing  model  of
deposit insurance (and  several  of its implementations  and extensions)  and the expected
loss pricing approach to pricing deposit insurance.
1.1  Merton (1977)'s Limited-Term Put-Option Model  of Deposit Insurance
In this section we describe  Merton's (1977) model of deposit insurance  that can be used
to calculate  the implicit value of deposit insurance, and the implementations of the model
by Ronn  and  Verma  (1986)  [henceforth,  RV  (1986)].  Merton  (1977)  shows  that  the
payoff of a perfectly credible third-party guarantee on the payment to the bondholders of
a  firm where there is  no uncertainty  about  the obligation of the guarantee being  met is
4 A pre-condition for efficient markets is that information is widely and cheaply available.
6identical to that of a put option, where  the promised payment corresponds to the exercise
price, and the value of the firm's assets V corresponds  to the underlying asset.
In applying this model  to a bank,  corporate  debt corresponds to deposits.  Because
most deposits  are due on demand, the maturity of deposit debt is very short. Customarily,
the maturity  of the  option  is  conceived  as  the  time until  the next  audit  of the bank's
assets.  Two more assumptions are conventionally made.  First, it is assumed that deposits
equal total bank debt and that principal and interest are both insured.  Second, the bank's
asset value is assumed to exhibit geometric Brownian motion
d  ln V, = pdt + adW,  (1)
where  V is  the value  of assets,  u is  the  instantaneous  expected  return  on  assets,  a  is
instantaneous  expected  standard deviation  of assets  returns,  and  W indicates  a standard
Wiener process. This allows us to use the Black and Scholes (1973) option-pricing model
to value the deposit insurance per unit of deposits
9 = ((af2;- t-h,)  - (  -)V  'D(-ht),  (2)
D
In((  + 2i-(T -t)
where  h, =  (  2  ,  g is the value  of the  deposit insurance  guarantee
per dollar of insured deposits,  0  is the cumulative  normal distribution  function,  T is the
time until maturity of the bank debt, t is time, D is the face value of the bank debt,  and  a
is the annualized dividend yield.
To  apply the model, values have to be assigned to two unobservable  variables:  the
bank's asset value V and the volatility parameter a.  RV (1986) generate proxy values for
these  unknowns  from  two  identifying  restrictions.  The  first  restriction  comes  from
modeling the directly observable  equity value of the bank as  a call option  on the bank's
assets with a strike price equal to the value of bank debt
E, = V, 0(d,) -D(D(d,  - cr\-i  t)  (3)
7Int  + -2(T  -t)
where  d, =  VI  +  RV  (1986)  model  equity  as being  dividend  protected
and therefore dividends  do not appear in the equation (3). Note that if dividends  are zero,
that  h, = d,.
The  relationship  between  the  equity  and  asset  volatility  implied  by  the  call
valuation becomes the second restriction
oEE,  (4)
Vt(D(d,)()
where  aE is the standard deviation of equity returns.5 Since the market value of equity is
observable  and the equity volatility can be estimated, two non-linear restrictions are now
in place for identifying two unknowns.
Data on total debt, bank equity, and equity volatility allow equations  (3)  and (4) to
be solved simultaneously  for the value of the bank's assets,  V, and the volatility of asset
returns,  a-. From these two values,  the value of deposit insurance per unit of deposits can
be  calculated  using  equation  (2).6  The  RV  (1986)  method  uses  the  sample  standard
deviation of daily stock returns as an  estimator for instantaneous  equity volatility.  Duan
(1994) points out that this is not an efficient estimator for instantaneous  equity volatility.
When  using the RV  (1986) method,  it is therefore recommended  to use  high-frequency
data to improve the efficiency of the estimator.
Thus far,  we  have assumed  that the next audit of the bank will take place  in one
year,  and that the debt matures at the audit date.  We have thus modeled deposit insurance
as a limited-term contract.  Since it is likely that the government will give the bank some
forbearance  after it finds out that the bank is undercapitalized modeling deposit insurance
as  a one-year  contract is restrictive.  It is clear that the value of insurance  is higher if the
audit  indicates  that  a  bank  is  undercapitalized  and  the  government  gives  the  bank
forbearance  instead of forcing it to immediately increase its capital ratio.
5  When estimating annual equity volatility from a sample of daily equity returns, it is recommended to
follow Fama (1965) who suggests to ignore days when the exchange is  closed.
6 When comparing premiums across countries, the value of deposit insurance per unit of deposits has to be
normalized on a single currency unit by the using the same currency for each country.
8RV  (1986)  incorporate  capital  forbearance  by the  bank  regulators  by permitting
asset values to deteriorate to a certain share of debt value,  p <1, before the option kicks
in. More specifically, RV (1986) assume a closure rule of V < pD, where  V  is the value
of the  bank's  assets,  D  is  the  value  of the  bank's  debt,  and  p  is  the  regulatory
forbearance  parameter.  In essence,  the RV (1986)  specification transfers  (1-p)  times the
bank's expected debt repayment  as risk capital to stockholders,  irrespective of the bank's
financial  status.7 With the  V < pD closure rule, the modified model is
E, = J'@(d') - pDcI(d  - acr\Yii)  (5)
1  ,+Cf2  (T  -t)
where  d  =  , and
V,O(d,)  (6)
RV  (1986)  estimate  instantaneous  equity  volatility  by  the  sample  standard
deviation  of daily  equity returns  and  therefore  impose  equity  volatility  to be  constant.
Duan  (1994,  2000)  points  out  that  such  a premise  is  inconsistent  with  the  underlying
theoretical  model of Merton  (1977)  where equity volatility is stochastic.  Therefore,  the
RV  (1986)  estimator does not possess the properties  such  as consistency  and efficiency
normally expected from a sound statistical procedure.  Duan (1994, 2000) has developed a
maximum  likelihood  framework  to estimate the  value of the  deposit  insurance  which  is
consistent with the assumption of Merton's (1977) theoretical model that equity volatility
is stochastic.  The Duan (1994, 2000) method has been applied to a large sample of banks
by Laeven (2002a);
As  an  alternative  to  risk-based  deposit  insurance  premiums,  Kuester  King  and
O'Brien (1991) consider a risk-adjusted examination  schedule  whereby riskier banks are
examined more frequently  with the possibility of closure  or regulatory  action following
each  examination.  They  show how  Merton's  (1977)  framework  can  be  used  to  derive
such a risk-adjusted examination  schedule.  In essence,  rather than setting  different prices
for deposit insurance,  this approach sets different examination  frequencies.
7 Hovakimian and Kane (2000) suggest assigning forbearance benefits only to economically insolvent
banks.
9For  several  reasons,  Merton's  (1977)  option-pricing  model  of deposit  insurance
gives downward biased estimates of the benefits bank stockholders derive from the safety
net.  First,  the  basic  model  in  Merton  (1977)  ignores  the  possibility  of regulatory
forbearance.  RV  (1986)  incorporate  capital  forbearance  by  the  bank  regulators  by
permitting  asset  values  to  deteriorate  to  a  given  percentage  of debt  value  before  the
option  kicks  in.  However,  the  level  of regulatory  control  is  unknown  ex  ante  which
makes  it  difficult  to  incorporate  the  RV  (1986)  model.  Moreover,  as  Laeven  (2000b)
points  out,  the  level of forbearance  is  likely  to  vary  across  countries.  It  is  likely  that
regulatory  control  is  weaker  in  countries  with  weak  banks,  so  that  one  would
underestimate  the value of deposit insurance to the most risky banks.
Second,  by  imposing  prompt  option  settlement,  Merton's  (1977)  single-period
model  of a  limited-term  option  contract  understates  stockholder  benefits  from deposit
insurance more than multi-period models do. The counterfactual assumption of a limited-
term  option  contract  is  that  at  the  time of an  audit  the  bank's  insurance  premium  is
adjusted to a new actuarially fair rate,  as in a variable rate insurance  scheme, and/or that
the bank's  capital  ratio is  adjusted  back to its minimum required  level.  Merton  (1978)
extends the standard single-period  model of deposit insurance to a multi-period setting by
treating  deposit  insurance  as  an  infmite-maturity  put  option.  In  Merton's  model,  the
government randomly audits banks  and closes banks if the bank becomes  economically
insolvent.  We  describe  Merton's  (1978)  model  in  more  detail  in  the  next  section.
Pennacchi  (1987a,  1987b)  allows  for  unlimited  term  contracts  and  shows  that  the
assumption  of a  limited-term  contract  in  a single-period  model  can underestimate  the
value of deposit insurance.
Third, Kane  (1995)  argues that option-pricing  models  suffer from treating banking
risk as  exogenous,  from  presuming the possibility of accurate risk measurement  and ex
ante  pricing,  and  from  modeling  deposit  insurance  as  a bilateral  contract between  the
insurer and the bank, thereby ignoring the agency  conflicts that arise from the difficulty
of enforcing  capitalization  requirements  in a multilateral  nexus of contracts.  In reality,
there  is  no  market  for  options  in open-ended  commitments  if banking  risk  cannot  be
observed and controlled on a continuous basis, even in well-developed capital markets.
10RV  (1986)  emphasize  that the option-based  approach  lends itself more readily to
cross-sectional  comparisons  of  risks  across  banks  rather  than  assessing  under-  or
overpricing  of deposit  insurance.  They  find  that  the  rank  orderings  of banks  remain
robust  to  changes  in model  specifications,  such  as  periodicity  of audit  and  degree  of
forbearance.
1.1.a  Application  of the Merton (1977)  model
Next,  we  illustrate  how  deposit  insurance  premiums  vary  by  input  parameters  in  the
theoretical  model  of Merton  (1977).  For simplicity we  assume  that dividends  are  zero,
and that the time until the next audit (the maturity of the put  option)  equals one.  In that
case,  it follows from equation (2) that the theoretical deposit insurance premium per unit
of deposits  (at  time  zero)  depends  only  on  the  asset  volatility,  a,  and  the  financial
leverage, DIV, of the bank.  Panel  A in Table  1 presents  the  deposit insurance  premium
per  US  dollar  of deposits  (in  percentage  points).  For  example,  for  a  bank  with  asset
volatility of 4 percent per annum  and a value of bank assets equal to  105  percent of the
value  of bank  debt,  the  deposit  insurance  premium  equals  0.22  percent  of total  bank
deposits.  We  find  that as  leverage  increases,  or  as  V/D decreases,  that the per  deposit
premium of deposit insurance  tends to increase.  We  also  find that greater  asset volatility
increases  the per deposit premium of deposit insurance.
To  assess  more  precisely  the  sensitivity  of  the  estimate  of  actuarially  fair
premiums  to changes  in financial  leverage or asset volatility it  can be useful to calculate
the  Delta,  A,  and  the  Vega  of the  deposit  insurance  put  option  contract.  The  Delta
represents  the rate of change of the  deposit  insurance premium  with respect to the value
of bank assets,  and the Vega is the rate of change in the price of deposit  insurance with
respect  to  the  volatility  of bank  assets.  Assuming  dividends  are  zero,  a  the  time  until
maturity is one year (T=1),  and keeping the value of deposits constant, Delta is given by
A  = @gV  = vk)(h,-I  (7) av
and Vega is given by
Ve=I'(h)  =VeXp(-h_2 /2)
Vega  ag-  = VVh  (8) av  'Jwhere  h  =2
Table 1  Deposit insurance premiums in the Merton (1977)  model
Premiums are  expressed in percentage points of deposits. Dividends are assumed zero.  Time until the next
audit (T) equals one. Time indicator (t) equals zero.
a.
V/D  \  1%  2%  3%  4%  5%  10%  15%  20%  25%
0.90  10.00  10.00  10.00  10.00  10.03  10.71  12.02  13.59  15.27
0.95  5.00  5.00  5.05  5.18  5.39  6.89  8.67  10.52  12.40
1.00  0.40  0.80  1.20  .1.60  1.99  3.99  5.98  7.97  9.95
1.05  0.00  0.00  0.07  0.22  0.45  2.06  3.95  5.91  7.89
1.10  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.06  0.95  2.50  4.29  6.19
1.15  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.39  1.52  3.06  4.81
1.20  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.15  0.89  2.15  3.71
1.1.b  Application of the Ronn and Verma (1986)  model
The Merton (1977) model cannot be applied  in practice,  because its two parameters,  the
value of bank assets  and asset  volatility,  are not observed.  This section  illustrates  how
deposit  insurance  premiums  vary  by  input  parameters  when  applying  RV's  (1986)
practical implementation  of Merton's  (1977) model. We assume that dividends are zero,
that the time until maturity equals one year, and that all bank debt is insured.  In this case,
it follows from equations (2) to (4a) that the price of deposit insurance  can be expressed
as a function of two observable  variables:  the equity volatility,  a., and the ratio of the
market value of equity to the market value of bank debt, EID.
Panel  A  in  Table. 2  presents  the  RV  (1986)  deposit  insurance  premiums  as  a
percentage  of deposits assuming that there is no regulatory capital  forbearance.  Panel  B
follows  the  specification  in  RV  (1986)  model  and  assumes  that  there  is  capital
forbearance  of the degree  p = 0.97, meaning that the bank is closed if the value of the
bank's  assets  is less  than  or equal  to  97 percent  of the  value  of the bank's  debt.  RV
(1986) takes this level as a reasonable proxy for the level of regulatory forbearance  in the
US. Although this level of forbearance  seems reasonable in a number of other countries,
12the  level  of forbearance  is  likely  to  be higher  in  many  other  countries,  such  as  most
developing  countries,  where  enforcement  of regulation  tends  to  be  weak.  Panel  C
assumes a larger degree of capital forbearance by setting the forbearance  parameter  p  to
0.95.  The  range  of premiums  in Panel  C  thus  seems  to  be  more  applicable  to  most
developing countries.
We  find  that  the  price  of deposit  insurance  increase  with  the  level  of  equity
volatility.  The  relation  between  deposit  insurance  premiums  and the  inverse  leverage
ratio  EID  is  less  straightforward,  and  depends  on  the  assumed  degree  of regulatory
forbearance,  p.  The  reason  is that the  deposit  insurance  premiums  are  expressed  as  a
percentage  of deposits.  The price of deposit insurance is also highly affected by the level
of regulatory  forbearance.  In particular,  going from  p =1  to  p =0.97 has large impact on
the premium. Indeed, RV (1986)  show for a sample of US banks that the rank ordering of
premiums  is less robust  to changes in  p  than to changes  in other model specifications.
The reason is that  a change  in  p  has  an impact  on both the  leverage  and the  estimate of
asset volatility.
In the basic model of RV (1986),  the time to maturity,  T, is assumed to be one year.
Merton (1977)  interprets the maturity of the put option as the length of time until the next
audit. RV (1986) experiment with the maturity by taking values from  1/4 to 5 years.  They
find  that increasing  the  maturity  increases  the  deposit  insurance  premium,  but that the
ranking of the banks is not much affected.
13Table 2  Ronn and Verma (1986) deposit insurance premiums as % of deposits
Dividends are assumed zero. Timne to mnaturity  (T) equals  1. It is assumed that all bank debt is insured.
Panel A:  p=1 (no capital-forbearance)
\  7E  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
E/D\
1  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.04  0.09  0.16  0.29
2  0.00  0.00  - 0.00  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.08  0.17  0.32  0.55
3  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.05  0.12  0.25  0.46  0.80
4  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.06  0.15  0.32  0.60  1.03
5  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.07  0.17  0.37  0.66  1.24
10  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.04  0.13  0.30  0.65  1.22  2.06
20  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.05  0.19  0.47  1.01  1.89  3.13
30  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.06  0.22  0.56  1.20  2.22  3.68
40  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.06  0.23  0.61  1.31  2.43  4.05
50  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.05  0.22  0.61  1.34  2.50  4.18
Panel B:  p =0.97 (capital-forbearance)
E  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
E/D\
1  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.01  2.02  2.04  2.09  2.19  2.32
2  1.00  1.00  1.01  1.04  1.10  1.19  1.31  1.49  1.74  2.09
3  0.12  0.24  0.36  0.48  0.62  0.79  0.99  1.27  1.64  2.12
4  0.00  0.04  0.13  0.26  0.41  0.61  0.86  1.19  1.64  2.24
5  0.00  0.01  0.06  0.17  0.31  0.52  0.80  1.17  1.69  2.39
10  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.06  0.18  0.39  0.74  1.27  2.03  3.08
20  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.13  0.37  0.80  1.50  2.53  3.99
30  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.11  0.36  0.83  1.62  2.79  4.45
40  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.10  0.34  0.83  1.65  2.90  4.66
50  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.09  0.32  0.81  1.65  2.92  4.72
Panel C:  p =0.95 (capital-forbearance)
>  ~~~10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
1  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.02  4.04  4.09  4.17  4.29
2  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.01  3.04  3.10  3.21  3.41  3.71
3  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.03  2.09  2.19  2.36  2.61  2.97  3.46
4  1.00  1.04  1.14  1.27  1.43  1.64  1.91  2.27  2.76  3.40
5  0.20  0.40  0.60  0.80  1.03  1.30  1.64  2.09  2.66  3.44
10  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.19  0.42  0.75  1.21  1.85  2.71  3.88
20  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.06  0.23  0.56  1.09  1.90  3.05  4.62
30  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.18  0.49  1.06  1.94  3.22  4.98
40  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.14  0.45  1.01  1.93  3.27  5.12
50  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.12  . 0.40  0.96  1.88  3.25  5.14
141.2  Merton (1978)'s Unlimited-Term  Put-Option Model  of Deposit Insurance
Merton (1978)  models deposit  insurance  as an  infinite-maturity put. The model extends
the  limited-term  model  in Merton  (1977)  to  an  unlimited  term  model  and  takes  into
account  explicitly  surveillance  or  auditing  costs  and  provides  for  random  auditing.
Several  papers  have built  on this  multiperiod perspective  by incorporating  a variety of
features describing bank and regulator behavior,  such as endogenous  capital adjustments
and regulatory forbearance. 8
We present Merton's  (1978)  model  without dividend payments.  The government
randomly audits banks  and follows the no-forbearance  closure rule  V < D.  Let  A  be the
audit rate  (in other words,  Adt  is the probability of an audit  taking place over the  next
instant), K the audit costs, and,  as before, let  V  equal the value of the bank's assets, D  the
value of the bank's deposits, and  a  the volatility of the bank's asset returns.
Merton  (1978)  shows that, if there are no barriers  to entry into banking,  that the
equilibrium deposit insurance premium per dollar of deposits can be written as
k* -l  5. p, (x) =1- 5+  k. x-6,  x>1  (9)
where x= VID,  k  = - {1-  6  +[(1+  )2 + y] 2 },  * = 2AK /2,  and  y - 82/ la 2
1.2.a  Application  of the Merton (1978)  model
Next,  we  investigate  how changes  in the  input parameters  affect  the deposit  insurance
premiums predicted by the Merton (1978)  model. As in Saunders and Wilson (1995), we
set audit costs per dollar of deposits, K, to 0.000134 (the US historical equivalent)  and the
auditing frequency,  A,  is set equal to 1. The resulting premium values,  p, (x), are treated
as  lump-sum  perpetuities  and multiplied  by a  yield  rate to  derive  an equivalent  annual
payment  amount.  As yield rate we use either 4 percent  (panel A in Table  3) or 8 percent
8 Pennacchi (1987a) extends the model to endogenize  mispriced deposit insurance.  Allen and Saunders
(1993) model deposit insurance as a callable put, i.e.  a compound option consisting of an infinite-maturity
put option held by the banks and a valuable call provision regarding  timing of bank closure retained by the
deposit insurer.  Cooperstein, Pennacchi, and Redburn (1995)  separate  the cost of deposit insurance on a
period-by-period basis, generalizing  the Merton model that only gives an estimate of the current present
value of deposit insurance.  Saunders and Wilson (1995) incorporate interim dividend payments by allowing
shareholders to receive dividends  until the next audit occurs,  even if the bank becomes insolvent in the
interim.
15(panel  B  in Table  3).  The  premiums  are highly  affected  by the  yield rate  on Treasury
bills. Basically, a doubling in the yield rate doubles the premium.
Unlike the premium  in the Merton  (1977)  model,  p, (x)  is not a monotonically
decreasing  function of the assets-to-deposits  ratio,  VID. The reason  is that there  are two
sources of the deposit insurer liability in the Merton (1978)  model:  (a) the guarantee of
deposits which  is a monotonically  decreasing  fimction of the assets-to-deposits  ratio, as
in  the  Merton  (1977)  model,  and  (b)  the  surveillance  or  audit  cost  which  is  a
monotonically  increasing  function  of the  assets-to-deposits  ratio.  The  latter  increases
even though the cost per audit is assumed constant because the expected number of audits
prior  to  a "successful"  audit where  the  bank  is  found  to  be insolvent  is an  increasing
function of the assets-to-deposits ratio. In particular, we find that leverage does not affect
the premium in case the asset return volatility is high.
Table 3  Deposit insurance premiums in the Merton (1978)  model
Deposit insurance premniums  are expressed  in percentage points of deposits. Premiums are calculated under
the  assumption  that  dividends  equal  zero.  A is  set  equal  to  one.  K=0.000134,  and the  Treasury  yield
(discount factor) equals 4 percent per annum. Premiums are calculated only for  V I D  1 .
V/D  \  ~1%  2%  3%  4%  5%  10%  15%  20%  25%
1.00  0.10  0.09  0.11  0.13  0.15  0.28  0.41  0.53  0.65
1.05  0.58  0.22  0.16  0.16  0.17  0.28  0.41  0.53  0.65
1.10  0.98  0.34  0.22  0.19  0.19  0.29  0.41  0.53  0.65
1.15  1.32  0.44  0.27  0.22  0.21  0.29  0.41  0.53  0.65
1.20  1.61  0.54  0.31  0.25  . 0.23  0.30  0.41  0.53  0.65
1.3  Expected  loss pricing
The  option-pricing  methodology  in  Merton  (1977,  1978)  is  limited  to  application  to
banks  for which  market  valuations  of the  bank's net  worth  are  available.  In  practical
terms,  this  typically  means  that the  put option  approach  to  value  deposit  insurance  is
limited to application to banks that are listed on a stock exchange.  However,  Cooperstein,
Pennacchi,  and Redburn (1995)  illustrate how a bank's net worth can be estimated from
reported cash  flows so that deposit insurance valuation can in principle be applied to all
banks, and not just to those that are publicly traded.
16Nevertheless,  one  should  acknowledge  the  limitations  of  the  option-pricing
methodology,  in  particular  when  applied  to  banks  in  countries  that  are  not  market-
oriented.  In  this  section  we  introduce  an  alternative  methodology  to  pricing  deposit
insurance  known as expected  loss  pricing.  The  advantage of this methodology is that is
very general in setup and can therefore be adopted to fit country-circumstances.
The principle  of expected  loss  pricing  is  simple,  and  can  be  represented  by  the
following equation:
Expected loss = Expected default probability  * Exposure * Loss given default.
In  the  above  equation,  the  "Expected  loss"  equals  the  size  of the  loss  to the  deposit
insurer  as  a  percentage  of insured  deposits,  and  thus  measures  the  cost  of deposit
insurance.  In order  to breakeven  in expectation,  the deposit insurer should  set a premium
per insured deposit  equal to  the expected  loss price.  The "Expected  default probability"
can  be  estimated  using  fundamental  analysis,  market  analysis,  or  rating  analysis.
Fundamental  analysis typically  involves the use of CAMEL-like ratings. Market analysis,
on the other hand,  uses interest rates or yields on uninsured bank debt, such as interbank
deposits,  subordinated  debt,  and  debentures.  Rating  analysis  indicates  the  use of credit
ratings of rating agencies, such  as Moody's and Standard and Poor's.  In principle, credit
ratings can be based on both fundamental and market analysis, although they also tend to
be affected  by political considerations.  The "Exposure" is usually equal  to the amount of
insured deposits, but can be set equal to total deposits (uninsured plus insured deposits) in
"too big too fail" cases.  "Loss  given default" indicates the size  of the loss to the deposit
insurance  fund  as a percentage of the total defaulted exposure to all insured deposits,  and
thus  indicates  the  severity of the  loss.  Good  indicators  for the loss  given  default  may
include  the  business  mix  of bank,  its  loan  concentration,  and  the  structure  of bank
liabilities.  Estimates  of  losses  given  default  are  typically  also  based  on  historical
experience.
Although  all  three  components  to  the  expected  loss  pricing  formula  (expected
default  probability,  exposure,  loss  given  default)  are  equally  important  in  terms  of
estimating  the  expected  of loss of a  bank  to  the  deposit  insurance  fund,  the  focus  is
typically  on  estimating  the  default  probability  of the  bank,  given  that  the  other  two
components  (exposure  and loss  given default)  are  relatively  easy  to  measure  given  the
17availability  of  bank-specific  information  on  the  amount  of  uninsured  deposits  and
historical information on the losses incurred by the deposit insurance fund given default.
In  the  following  section  we  present  how  analysis  of credit  ratings  and  interest
rates on  uninsured  debt  can  be used  to  estimate  the  expected  default probabilities.  We
focus  on  the  analysis  of credit  ratings  and  interest  rates  rather  than  on  fundamental
analysis,  because  fundamental  analysis  is  more  ad  hoc  and  is  not  based  on  market
principles.  Nevertheless,  in  practice  one  may  use  fundamental  analysis  of  expected
default probabilities,  either as a complement to the other two types of analyses to check
for robustness, or in case the other types of analyses cannot be carried out due to the lack
of data on either market rates or credit ratings.
Credit  ratings  can  be  translated  in  expected  default  probabilities  by  using
historical  default  probabilities.  Both  rating  agencies  like  Moody's  and  Standard  and
Poor's  have  extensive  time  series  on  historical  default  rates  for  each  of their  rating
categories.  In  the  case  of Moody's,  these  time  series  go  back  to  the  year  1920.  For
example,  one  can translate  credit ratings on long-term  bank deposits  by using historical
default rates on corporate bonds in the same rating category,  and use these default rates as
an estimate of the expected default probability of the bank. To reduce measurement error,
it is advisable to estimate one-year default probabilities by taking the average  cumulative
default  rate  over  several  years.  The  optimal  number  of years  depends  on the  specific
situation.  It  should  be  large  enough  to reduce  measurement  error,  but short  enough  in
order not to use outdated information.
Market  analysis of expected default probabilities  is based on the principles of no
arbitrage  and  risk-neutral  pricing.  Let  rf  be the  interest  rate  on riskless  debt,  r  the
interest rate on risky debt, and  p  the expected default probability.  The principles of no
arbitrage and risk-neutral pricing then imply that the payoff of one US dollar invested in
riskless debt should equal the expected payoff of one US dollar invested in risky debt. In
other  words,  1  + rf  equals  (1- p)(l + r).  This  implies  that  the  expected  default
probability can be calculated as
l+rf  r-rf
p  l+1-  ,r  l+  2  r>rf.  (10)
18In  case  of deposits,  one  can  apply  this  methodology  to  estimate  bank  default
probabilities by setting r  equal to the interest rate on uninsured deposits, and. rf equal to
the yield on zero-coupon  Treasury securities  rate.  Uninsured  deposits  can include such
deposits as interbank deposits.  r - rf is the risk premium on uninsured deposits.9
The above  methodology  to estimate  bank default probabilities  is only suitable  for
application  to  deposit  premiums  on  uninsured  deposits,  not  to  deposit  premiums  on
insured deposits. The reason is that risk premiums on insured deposits not only reflect the
risk of the individual deposit-issuing  bank (as  do risk premiums on uninsured deposits),
but are also affected by the credibility of deposit insurance, i.e., the guarantor risk, which
is  difficult  to.estimate.  Guarantor  risk  comprises  both  the  risk of repudiation  of the
guarantee  and  the  restitution  costs  borne by depositor  when  seeking  restitution  of his
insured  deposit  losses.  Because  of the  protection  provided  by deposit  insurance,  risk
premiums on insured deposits tend to be lower than risk premiums on uninsured deposits.
If deposit insurance  were  fully  credible,  depositors  do not bear losses  in case  of bank
failure,  inducing  a low risk premium on insured  deposits.  With imperfect  credibility of
deposit  insurance,  the  risk  premium  on  insured  deposits  is  higher.  By using  data  on
uninsured deposits one avoids the problem of estimating the guarantor risk.
Since  the above  methodology  to  estimate bank  default  probabilities  requires  the
availability  of data  on  deposit  rates  on  uninsured  deposits,  it  can  not  be  applied  to
countries  that insure all deposits.  A more  general problem with using deposit premiums
to  estimate default probabilities  is that they are influenced by monetary policy and may
therefore not only reflect default probabilities.
Given  the  problems  associated  with the  use of deposit  rates  to  estimate  default
probabilities, one may consider to use interest rates or yield data on marketable securities
9  The existence of a deposit rate premium has been documented in the banking literature. For example,
using data on insured certificates  of deposit (CDs) rates of  US banks, Hannan and Hanweck (1988) find
statistically significant relationships between CD rates and institution risk as measured by such variables as
leverage,  variability of earnings,  and risk assets. Using data on CD rates of US thrifts, Cook and Spellman
(1994) provide evidence that there is risk pricing of guaranteed deposits, implying expected loss from
incomplete deposit insurance coverage. Cook and Spelhnan (1996) develop a framework that enables to
decompose observed  CD premiums into firm and guarantor risk. They show that the premiums  on
guaranteed deposits are multiplicatively related to bank risk and guarantor risk. When bank risk is constant,
the premiums as well as interest rate spreads are proportional to guarantor risk. Bartholdy, Boyle, and
Stover (2002)  find that the deposit premium is higher on average in countries without explicit deposit
insurance than in countries with explicit deposit insurance.
19to  estimate  default  probabilities,  assuming  that  such  data  are  available.  In  case  of
unsecured, risky debt, such as subordinated debentures, we can restate equation (10) as
p = 1- 1r  - l  ,  (lOa)
1+y  l+y
where p  is the  one-year probability  of default  on the  default  risky debt, y is  the
yield  on  the  one-year,  zero-coupon  default  risky  debt  (for  example,  subordinated
debenture),  rf  is  the  yield  on  the  one-year,  zero-coupon,  default  risk-free  debt  (for
example, Treasury bond),  and  y - rf  is the yield spread.  In case  of simple, unsecured,
subordinated  debt  with  no  call  features,  provisions  or  restrictions  and  no  liquidity
premiums,  the  yield  spread  equals  the between  the  one-year  zero-coupon  yield  on the
subordinated debenture and the one-year zero-coupon yield on the Treasury security.
In case  of zero-coupon  default  risky  debt with  a maturity  longer  than  one  year,
expected  default probabilities  for each  year  can be  calculated  if prices  on zero-coupon
subordinated  debentures  and  zero-coupon  Treasury  bonds  are  available  for  every  year
until  maturity  (see,  for  example,  Then  and  Litterman,  1991).  In  this  manner,  a  term
structure of the bank's credit risk can be estimated.
The above  analysis can  only be  applied  to risky  zero-coupon  bonds,  not to  risky
coupon bonds. The reason for this is that, if the bank defaults on a coupon payment, then
all subsequent coupon payments (and payments of principal)  are also  defaulted on. Thus,
the  default  on  one  of  the  "mini"  bonds  associated  with  a  given  maturity  is  not
independent of the event of default on the "mini" bond associated with a later maturity.  In
practice,  single payment,  zero-coupon corporate bonds may not be traded,  in which case
it is more difficult to estimate the term structure  of spreads.  In such cases, and for more
complex  corporate  debt  instruments  option  pricing  theory  can  be  applied  to  price  the
risky debt and estimate default probabilities (Merton,  1974).
The  usefulness  of using  market  rates  on  unsecured  bank  debt  as  a  tool  for
estimating  default  probabilities  not  only relies  on  the  liquidity  of the  unsecured  debt
market,  but it  also presumes that  holders of such  unsecured  bank  debt  exercise  market
discipline,  meaning  that  they  monitor  the  bank  and  price  the  risk  of the  bank.  The
banking  literature  has provided  ample evidence  of the existence  of market discipline  in
20several  markets.10 Of course,  the  existence  of market  discipline  may  differ  across
countries  and  debt  markets.  This  should  be  taken  into  account  when  applying  the
expected loss pricing methodology to price deposit insurance.
1.3.a  Application of expected  loss  pricing
In this section we apply the methodology of expected loss pricing of deposit insurance  to
bank credit  ratings  and yields  on subordinated bank  debt.  Table  4 shows  the results for
different scenarios.  Panel A in Table 4 highlights the expected loss pricing method using
Moody's  credit  ratings.  Panel  B  in Table  4 highlights  the  expect  loss  pricing  method
using  yield  rates  on subordinated  debt.  In principle,  one  can  apply the methodology  to
any type of uninsured bank debenture, not just subordinated debt.
Column l in panel A of Table 4 reports the broad  classification of Moody's credit
ratings.  Moody's  credit  ratings  range  from  Aaa to  C,  where Aaa indicates  high  credit
rating and C indicates  low credit rating. Column 1 in Panel B reports the yield on a one-
year, zero-coupon  Treasury bond. We  set this yield equal to 3  percent for each scenario.
Column  2  in Panel  A  transforms  the  credit  ratings  into  five-year  average  cumulative
default rates.  The average  cumulative  default  rate over  five  years  are calculated  using
historical default rates for the period  1920-99 and are taken from Exhibit 31  of Moody's
Historical  Default  Rates  of Corporate  Bond  Issuers,  1920-1999  (Moody's,  2000).  Note
that we  use historical  default rates  on corporates  rather than banks  as  estimate  for the
default rates of banks. Column 2 in Panel B reports the spread of a one-year,  zero-coupon
subordinated  bank  debt  over  the  one-year,  zero-coupon  Treasury  bond.  Column  3 in
Panel A reports the one-year  default rate  for each corresponding  credit rating.  The one-
year default  rate is calculated by dividing  the average cumulative default  rate over five
years  reported in column  1 by five.  Column  3  in Panel  B reports  the average  one-year
likelihood  of default,  which  is  calculated  using risk-neutral  pricing  (see  equation  lOa).
This  means  that  the  average  one-year  likelihood of default  p  equals  (y - rf  ) /(1 + y),
where  y - rf is the spread of the one-year,  zero-coupon  subordinated bank debt over the
'° For example, Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) find that depositors in Argentina,  Chile and Mexico
discipline banks by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rates  on deposits. Flannery and
Sorescu (1996) find evidence of bank market discipline in the US subordinated debt market.
21one-year,  zero-coupon  Treasury bond  and  y  is the yield on the one-year,  zero-coupon
subordinated bank debt, which in this case can be calculated  as the yield on a one-year,
zero-coupon  Treasury  bond  rf  plus  the  spread  of  the  one-year,  zero-coupon
subordinated  bank debt  y - rf. Column  4  in panels  A  and  B  reports  the  loss  rate  on
assets.  The  loss rate is  set equal  to  8 percent of bank  assets,  which corresponds  to  the
FDIC's historical loss rates  on bank assets for banks with assets  exceeding  5 billion US
dollars.  Column  5 in  panels  A  and  B  reports  the  expected  one-year  loss  rate  as  a
percentage  of assets, which  corresponds  to the  product of the  one-year  default rate  and
the loss rate on assets. Column 6 in panels A and B reports the share of deposits  in total
bank assets,  and therefore indicates the loss exposure in terms of total assets. Column 7 in
panels A and B reports the expected  loss as a percentage of deposits,  wvhich corresponds
to the quotient  of  the  figures in column 4 and column 5. Column 8 in panels A and B
reports the expected loss in basis points (bp) of deposits, and equals the product of 10,000
times  the  figure  in  column  6:  The  expected  loss  in basis  points  (bp)  of deposits  is  an
estimate of the assessment rate for deposit insurance.
22Table 4  Expected  loss pricing
Panel A  in Table 4 highlights  the  expected loss pricing  method using Moody's  credit ratings.  Panel B  in
Table 4 highlights the expect  loss pricing  method using yield rates on subordinated debt.  We set the  yield
on a one-year,  zero-coupon Treasury bond equal to  3%  for each scenario.  The average cumulative  default
rate over five years are  calculated using historical default rates for the period 1920-99  and are taken from
Exhibit  31  of Moody's  Historical Default Rates  of Corporate Bond Issuers,  1920-1999  (Moody's,  2000).
The  loss rate  is set equal  to 8%  of bank assets,  which corresponds  to the  FDIC's historical loss  rates  on
bank assets for banks with assets exceeding US$ 5 billion.
Panel A  Credit ratings
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Credit  5-year cumulative  1-year default  Loss rate  1-year loss rate Deposits/  Expected loss  Expected loss
rating  default rate  rate  on assets  (% of assets)  Assets  (% of  deposits)  (bp of deposits)
Aaa  0.20%  0.04%  8%  0.00%  75%  0.00%  0.43
Aa  0.36%  0.07%  8%  0.01%  75%  0.01%  0.78
A  0.55%  0.11%  8%  0.01%  75%  0.01%  1.18
Baa  1.97%  0.39%  8%  0.03%  75%  0.04%  4.21
Ba  12.88%  2.58%  8%  0.21%  75%  0.27%  27.47
B  30.16%  6.03%  8%  0.48%  75%  0.64%  64.33
Caa-C  43.37%  8.67%  8%  0.69%  75%  0.93%  92.52
Panel B  Subordinated bank debt
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Spread of
T-bond  subordinated  debt  1-year default  Loss rate  1-year loss rate Deposits/  Expected loss  Expected loss
yield  over T-bond  rate  on assets  (% of assets)  Assets  (% of deposits)  (bp of deposits)
3%  0.05%  0.05%  8%  0.00%  75%  0.01%  0.54
3%  0.10%  0.10%  8%  0.01%  75%  0.01%  1.03
3%  0.20%  0.19%  8%  0.02%  75%  0.02%  2.07
3%  0.40%  0.39%  8%  0.03%  75%  0.04%  4.13
3%  0.60%  0.58%  8%  0.05%  75%  0.06%  6.18
3%  0.80%  0.77%  8%  0.06%  75%  0.08%  8.22
3%  1.00%  0.96%  8%  0.08%  75%  0.10%  10.26
3%  1.20%  1.15%  8%  0.09%  75%  0.12%  12.28
3%  1.40%  1.34%  8%  0.11%  75%  0.14%  14.30
3%  1.60%  1.53%  8%  0.12%  75%  0.16%  16.32
3%  1.80%  1.72%  8%  0.14%  75%  0.18%  18.32
3%  2.00%  1.90%  8%  0.15%  75%  0.20%  20.32
3%  2.50%  2.37%  8%  0.19%  75%  0.25%  25.28
3%  3.00%  2.83%  8%  0.23%  75%  0.30%  30.19
232. Design  Features and Pricing of Deposit Insurance
Deposit  insurance  premiums  differ  widely  across  countries,  depending  on  the  design
features of the deposit insurance scheme of the respective countries and their institutional
environment,  among others.  Table 5 presents country averages of actuarially fair deposit
insurance  premium  estimates.  These  figures  are  taken  from  Hovakimian,  Kane,  and
Laeven (2002), and are calculated by applying the RV (1986) method to a large sample of
banks in different  countries  for the  period  1991-99.  The  premiums  are  expressed  as  a
percentage  of deposits,  and  are  estimated  either under the  assumption of no  regulatory
forbearance  (p=1),  or  under  the  assumption  of a regulatory  forbearance  parameter  of
p =0.97,  as in the original  RV (1986) model. The estimates are based on calculations for
listed banks and as such for a better-than-average  sample of the banks in each country.
Without  forbearance  the  country  averages  range  from less than  0.001  percent  of
deposits in Australia,  Austria,  Germany,  and Luxembourg to  1.93  percent of deposits in
Russia,  and  average  0.18  percent  of deposits.  The  premiums  tend  to  be  lower  for
developed countries.  They average 0.04 percent for developed  countries, but 0.32 percent
for developing countries.  These figures are under-estimates  of the actuarially fair price of
deposit insurance, mainly because they ignore regulatory forbearance.
With a  regulatory  forbearance  parameter  of p =0.97,  the country-averages  range
from  0.01  percent  of deposits  in  Australia,  Switzerland  and  the  US to  2.94  percent  of
deposits  in  Russia,  and  average  0.41  percent  of  deposits.  The  premiums  under
forbearance  also tend to be lower for developed countries.  They average 0.15 percent for
developed  countries, but 0.64 percent for developing countries.  It is, however,  difficult to
choose the level of regulatory forbearance  a priori, particularly across countries.
This  section investigates  how  several  design  features  affect the  price  of deposit
insurance,  and  vice  versa.  In  particular,  we  focus  on  the  relation  between  deposit
insurance  coverage  and the price of deposit  insurance,  and how risk diversification  and
risk  differentiation  within  a  deposit  insurance  system  can  reduce  the  price  of deposit
insurance.
24Table 5  Ronn and Verma (1986) deposit insurance premiums by country
Premiums are expressed  as  a percentage  of deposits.  Sample period is  1991-99. Premiums  are estimated
both under the assumption  of no regulatory forbearance (p=l.00) and under the assumption of a regulatory
forbearance  parameter of p=0.97  (as  in RV,  1986).  Time to maturity  (T) equals  1. It is  assumed that  all
bank  debt  is  insured.  The  implied  premium  estimates  are  taken  from Hovakimian,  Kane,  and  Laeven
(2002).  The developing  versus  developed  country  classification  follows  the country  classification of the
World Bank.
Developing  countries  Developed  countries
Country  Premium  Country  Premium
(% of deposits)  (% of deposits)
p=l.00  p=0.97  p=l.00  p=0.97
Argentina  0.361  0.579  Australia  0.000  0.005
Bangladesh  0.067  0.769  Austria  0.000  0.374
Brazil  0.923  1.701  Canada  0.013  0.143
Chile  0.003  0.018  Denmark  0.091  0.178
Colombia-  0.039  0.107  Finland  0.010  0.109
Cyprus  0.043  0.097  France  0.004  0.105
Czech Rep.  0.057  0.323  Germany  0.000  0.152
Ecuador  0.062  0.176  Greece  0.183  0.408
Hungary  0.078  0.422  Hong Kong  0.441  0.614
India  0.192  0.603  Ireland  0.002  0.018
Indonesia  0.466  0.798  Israel  0.001  0.093
Kenya  0.708  1.018  Italy  0.016  0.135
Korea, Rep. of  0.280  0.853  Japan  0.090  0.417
Malaysia  0.350  0.618  Luxembourg  0.000  0.066
Morocco  0.002  0.042  Netherlands  0.003  0.030
Pakistan  0.078  0.403  Norway  0.002  0.174
Peru  0.350  0.670  Portugal  0.005  0.058
Philippines  0.408  0.623  Singapore  0.013  0.040
Poland  0.155  0.276  Spain  .0.051  0.073
Russia  1.928  2.943  Sweden  0.021  0.214
South Africa  0.054  0.211  Switzerland  0.002  0.006
SriLanka  0.112  0.358  UnitedKingdom  0.011  0.092
Taiwan  0.020  0.059  United States  0.002  0.009
Thailand  0.780  1.189
Zimbabwe  0.536  1.157
Average  Average
Developing countries  0.322  0.641  Developed countries  0.042  0.153
Grand average  0.188  0.407  Grand average  0.188  0.407
252.1  Design  features of deposit insurance
The actuarially fair price of deposit insurance  is affected by several structure  and design
features of a deposit insurance  system.  The Annex to this paper  summarizes some of the
most  important  design  features  for all  existing  explicit deposit insurance  schemes in the
world  as  of  end-year  2000,  in  particular  regarding  such  issues  as  membership,
administration,  funding,  coverage,  and pricing.  11,12  For a comprehensive  discussion of
these design  features  of deposit insurance systems,  we refer to Garcia  (2000), Demirgiiu-
Kunt and Sobaci (2001), World Bank (2001), and  Demirguc-Kunt  and Kane (2002).
Bank  membership  of  the  deposit  insurance  system  can  be  compulsory  or
voluntarily.  To reduce adverse  selection,  membership  should  be compulsory.  Panel  A in
the Annex shows that most countries  indeed opt for compulsory membership  (around  86
percent of countries).  The  effectiveness  of regulatory  discipline  of banks  depends  to  a
large extent  on how deposit insurance is administered  (Barth, Caprio, and Levine,  2001).
A  deposit insurance  scheme may be privately,  publicly,  or jointly funded  and operated,
and may or may not have government financial backing. Most countries operate a scheme
that  has  some  degree  of private  funding.  Of all  countries  with a  funded  scheme,  17.1
percent  operate  a privately-funded  scheme,  only  1.4 percent  a publicly-funded  scheme,
and  82.9 percent operate  a scheme that is funded jointly by banks and the government.
The management of deposit insurance  scheme on the other hand tends to remain a public
affair.  Of all  countries  with  a deposit  insurance  scheme,  only  18.3  percent  operate  a
privately-managed  scheme, 50.7 percent a publicly-managed,  and 31.0 percent a scheme
that is managed jointly by private parties and the government (see panel A in the Annex).
To  encourage depositor discipline,  some countries  require depositors  to bear risk
on their  deposits  by adopting  a system  of coinsurance.  Proper  coinsurance  covers  the
smallest tranche of deposits in full, and imposes a haircut on larger deposits.  This fosters
market discipline by the larger depositors,  who are expected to have better access  to the
necessary  information  to  exercise  market  discipline  than  small  depositors.  In practice,
coinsurance  generally provides  that insured depositors  are not protected in full, but only
1  l Since end-2000, the introduction of deposit insurance has been planned or is under consideration in the
following countries:  Albania, Bolivia,  China, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Russia, and Zambia.
12 Panel A of the Annex presents information regarding membership, administration and funding of deposit
insurance by country; panel B presents infornation regarding the coverage of the scheme; and panel C
presents infornation regarding the pricing of deposit insurance.
26for  a  portion  (for  example,  90  percent)  of their  insured  balances.  As  of end-2000,
coinsurance  was  effective  in 28.2  percent  of countries  with  explicit deposit  insurance,
with the  depositor- standing  to loose  a small  percentage  of the  covered  deposit,  while
being reimbursed for the majority part (see Panel B in the Annex).
Limiting  the coverage  of deposit  insurance  is the most common way to contain
moral  hazard,  and  therefore  to  reduce  the  price  of deposit  insurance.  Limits  render
deposit insurance  partial.  The  coverage  limit  should be  low enough  to encourage  large
depositors  and creditors  to monitor the banks  and exercise  market discipline.  Limits on
the insurance  coverage  expose  some  depositors  to  the risk of loss  in the event of bank
failure and provide  incentives for demanding  higher deposit rates  from weaker banks or
for  withholding  funds  entirely  from  troubled  banks.  Market  discipline  can -also  be
achieved by excluding certain types of deposits or bank liabilities, for instance, inter-bank
deposits.
Currently, almost all countries place limits on the explicit coverage they offer (see
Panel  B  in  the  Annex).1 3 Several  countries  have  temporarily  extended  full  coverage
because of acute  financial distress.14 The coverage varies widely, ranging from 0.2 times
per capita GDP in the Ukraine to 19.4 times per capita GDP in Chad. As of end-2000, the
average coverage is 3.2 times per capita GDP.'5
A country has to decide  on the types of deposits  should be covered,  and on the
coverage  limit for each of the insured type of deposits. Common candidates  for exclusion
of insurance are inter-bank deposits,  govenmment  deposits and foreign-currency  deposits.
Exclusion of such types of deposits can  substantially lower the cost of deposit insurance.
Most countries  aim to insure small household deposits. The percentage  of the number of
deposits  accounts  covered  therefore  tends  to  be  high  (on  average  over  90  percent).
However,  the percentage  of the value of deposits  covered can be substantially  lower (see
panel B in the Annex).
13 In some countries, coverage  is bank-specific.  For example, in Germany coverage varies with a bank's
capital.
14 As of end-2000,  six countries (Ecuador, Honduras,  Japan, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey) that normally
have explicit but limited coverage, have temporarily, but explicitly, extended full coverage.  In addition,
three countries without a system of deposit insurance  (Indonesia, Malaysia,  and Thailand) have explicitly
extended full coverage  during their financial crises.
5  This figure excludes  countries with full coverage.
27Another  effective way of reducing  the  coverage  of deposits  is to  exclude  large
deposits.  The  advantage  of this  approach  is  that  it  serves  the  political  objective  of
insuring  small  household  deposits,  while  encouraging  market  discipline  by  large
depositors,  who are likely to be better informed than small depositors.
The decision whether to cover foreign-currency  deposits depends  to a large extent
on the share of foreign-currency  deposits in the country.  When usage of foreign  currency
by households  is high,  it would be of little value to the households not to cover foreign-
currency  deposits.16 The coverage of foreign-currency  deposits will, however,  discourage
the  development  of local-currency  savings.  In  countries  where this  is  an  issue,  it may
therefore  be desirable to have more favorable insurance  terms on local-currency  deposits
than on foreign-currency  deposits.
Of all design features,  the pricing of deposit insurance  is of course most directly
reflected  in the premium system.  As deposits  are the entity that is insured,  most systems
use  deposits  as the base on which  to  levy premiums.  In  some  cases,  the premiums  are
levied only on insured categories  of deposits or only on the amount actually  covered.  A
few countries  use a premium  assessment  base other than  deposits,  such as  risk-adjusted
assets (see Panel C in the Annex).
The  premium  can  be  the  same  for  each  bank,  a  so-called  flat-rate  premium
system,  or the premium can be differentiated by bank on the basis of bank-specific  risks,
a so-called risk-based  system. The particular difficulties related to executing  an equitable
system of risk-adjusted premiums include:  (a) measuring bank risk; (b) access  to reliable
and timely data;  (c)  ensuring that rating  criteria  are transparent;  and (d) examining  the
potential  destabilizing  effect  of imposing  high premiums  on  troubled  banks  (Financial
Stability Forum,  2001). The most commonly used measures of bank risk include  capital
adequacy,  CAMEL  ratings,  and  supervisory  ratings.  Some  countries  combine  these
measures  to  arrive  at  a  composite  measure  for  differentiating  among  banks.  Thus  far,
only a few countries  use more complex methods for assessing risk (such as Argentina and
16 Usage of foreign-currency  deposits is high indeed in several countries.  As of end-1999,  countries  with
foreign-currency deposits being more than halve of  total deposits included:  Angola, Argentina, Armenia,
Azerbaijan,  Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Croatia, Georgia, Lebanon, Nicaragua,  Peru, and Tajikistan;  and
countries with foreign-currency  deposits being between one-third and halve of total deposits included:
Belarus, Costa Rica,  Lithuania, Moldova,  Mongolia, Mozambique,  Philippines, Romania, Russia,  Turkey,
Ukraine, Vietnam and Zambia (Honohan and Shi, 2002).
28Canada). Currently, none of the countries uses the option-pricing method or other market-
based methods  explored in this paper to assess premiums  (see Panel C in the Annex for
the  basis  of risk-adjusting  premiums  in  different  countries).  Despite  the  difficulties
associated  with  implementing  a  risk-based  deposit  insurance  system,  an  increasingly
large number of countries has decided to do so. As of end-2000,  risk-adjusted premiums
are used in 40.8 percent of countries with explicit deposit insurance.
Before  the  adoption  of a  deposit  insurance  scheme,  its  insurability  should  be
assessed.  The terms  and  conditions  that need  to  hold  for  a risk  to be insurable  can be
broadly  summarized  as  fortuity  of  event,  insurable  interest  of  insured  parties  and
indemnity basis of settlement.  A more rigorous development  of the limits of insurability
of risks is given by Berliner (1982). He argues that the insurability of a risk is greater if:
(a) losses occur with a high degree of randomness;  (b) the maximum possible loss is very
limited;  (c)  the  average  loss  amount  upon  loss  occurrence  is  small;  (d)  losses  occur
frequently;  (e)  the insurance premium is high;  (f) the possibility of moral hazard is low;
(g) the coverage of the risk is consistent with public policy;  and (h) the law permits  the
cover.  With  respect to deposit  insurance,  arguably only the latter  two  criteria are  met.
Bank  failures  are to  some  extent predictable  and  often do not occur  independently.  For
example,  during banking crises, many banks enter distress.  Thus, deposit insurance losses
do not occur with a high degree of randomness.  Once losses occur, these losses tend to be
large. The failure of a single large bank could in fact pose a systemic risk to the banking
sector  and  have  negative  spillover  effects  to  the  corporate  and  household  sectors.  In
addition,  deposit insurance premiums tend to be set low for political reasons, and deposit
insurance encourages  extensive moral hazard.  These insurability criteria should be taken
into account at an early stage when considering the adoption of deposit insurance. If most
of these criteria cannot be met at least partially, deposit insurance  should not be adopted.
Several  of these  criteria,  in particular  points  (e)  and  (f)  may be  largely met  through  a
well-desigrned  deposit  insurance  scheme.  We  have  presented  several  methods  that  can
help  set  premiums  that  are  actuarially  fair,  and  have  argued  that  moral hazard  can be
curbed by risk-adjusted premiums,  a low coverage and co-insurance.17
" When setting initial contributions in countries where the deposit insurer also has regulatory functions, it
should be decided who pays for such regulatory expenses  (Buser, Chen and Kane, 1981).
29Although  we  have  identified  several  design  features  of deposit  insurance  that
could  curtail  moral  hazard,  the  practical  design  and  implementation  of  a  deposit
insurance  system needs to deal with several more complicated issues. The challenge is to
implement  a  deposit  insurance  scheme  that  is  incentive-compatible  for  all  parties
involved.'8 An incentive-compatible  insurance system would provide  incentives to banks
to truthfully reveal the necessary information and thereby facilitate the efficient pricing of
the  risk  shifted  to  the  deposit  insurer.  As  mentioned  earlier,  many  countries  are
considering  the  introduction  of risk-based  insurance  premiums  in  an  effort  to  price
deposit insurance more  fairly and to give better incentives to banks. Although  fair pricing
of deposit  insurance  may eliminate  inequitable  wealth  transfers,  it need  not  lead  to  an
efficient equilibrium  that is incentive-compatible.  For example, when banks have private
information  concerning the  quality of the bank's assets,  a risk-sensitive  pricing policy is
likely  to provide banks with  similar risk-taking  incentives  that  is associated  with a risk-
insensitive pricing arrangement.
2.2  Coverage  and pricing of deposit insurance
The cost of a deposit insurance  system can be dramatically reduced by excluding certain
types of deposits (such  as large  deposits,  foreign  currency deposits,  inter-bank  deposits,
and/or  government  deposits).  It  is  therefore  often  thought  that  the  exclusion  of some
deposits  renders  a  lower  deposit  insurance  premium  valid.  However,  as  long  as  all
deposits  have equal  seniority,  excluding deposits  does not  lower the  per insured  deposit
premium of deposit insurance.  This section explains why this is the case.
For  now,  assume  for  simplicity  that  all  bank  debt  are  deposits.  The  premium
expressed  as percentage  of insured  deposits is dependent on the amount of total  deposits
of the  bank  - not  on  the  amount  of insured  deposits,  as  long  as  the  seniority  of all
18  Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1992)  show that, when banks hold nontraded private-information  assets,
it is impossible  to implement a risk-sensitive  deposit insurance pricing scheme that is incentive  compatible
unless banks earn rents or are subsidized by the regulator. Gianunarino,  Lewis, and Sappington (1993)
show that banks' asset quaiity is below the first-best level under a socially optimal deposit insurance
scheme. Kanatas  (1986) suggests to overcome  such informational  asymmetry problems by using a banks'
access to discount window credit to reveal their asset quality, and proposes to integrate  risk-based deposit
insurance pricing  with discount window policy.  On the other hand, Craine (1995)  shows that, if there exist
intermediaries  that hold traded public-information  securities and that are allowed to issue insured deposits,
an efficient  separating equilibrium can be reached by separating the market for insured deposits from
private-information  financial intermediation.
30deposits  (insured  plus  not  insured)  is  equal.  This  means  that  for  a  given  amount  of
deposits, the actuarially  fair deposit insurance premium per dollar of insured deposits is
constant.  Of  course,  the  total  amount  of deposit  insurance  premium  varies  with  the
amount of insured deposits  on a one-to-one  basis.  In  other words,  if bank  debt  equals
deposits  D, the  per  dollar  deposit  insurance  premium  is  a  function  of total  deposits,
denoted g,  and the total value of deposit  insurance,  denoted  G,  is a function  of insured
deposits D1. Formally,  g = g(D), and  G = gD, = g(D)D,.
More generally, if the bank issues non-deposit  debt, but all debt can be considered
a single-homogeneous  debt,  as  assumed  in Merton  (1977),  then  the  per-dollar  deposit
insurance premium depends  on total debt, not on total (insured) deposits. To see this, let
V be the unobserved  post-insurance  value of the bank's  assets, B,  the face  value of the
insured deposits, B2 the face value of all debt liabilities other than the insured deposits, B
B,  + B2 the face value of total debt liabilities,  o-,  the instantaneous  standard deviation
of the return on bank's  assets, and T the time until next audit of the bank's assets. Now,
assuming  all  pre-insurance  debt to  be of equal  seniority,  holders  of deposits would be
entitled  to either the future value of their deposits, or to a pro-rated  fraction of the value,
should the value be less than total  debt. In other words, the deposit holders will receive
min{FV(Bi), B  TBt  }  upon maturity of the debt, where FV(.) denotes the future value
operator,  and  VT  is the terminal  value of the bank's assets.  Thus, the maturity value of
deposit insurance is given by max{O FV(B,) - B  +B 2 }
Then,  following  Merton  (1977),  the value of the insurance  is  equivalent  to the
value of a put, written with a striking price equal to total debt, and then scaled  down by
the proportion of demand deposits to total debt,  B, / B . To see this, note that the deposit
insurance value, denoted P,  is given by
p =B,0(h +a,,T)  - V'B  D(h)  (1
Bi +B2
3  1VBI l(Bi + B2))  av  I  lt)  - v: 
where  h  and  D(.)  is  the  cumulative
density  function  of a  standard normal  random  variable.  And,  therefore,  the per  dollar
deposit insurance premium, denoted g, with  g = P/B,, is then given by
g =  (h +  v \/i)  - B D(h),  (12)
InB)_  a  TI2
where  h  --  (RV,  1986).  Note,  that  the  per-dollar  deposit  insurance
Crv  Xf
premium does not depend directly on the risk-free rate of interest.
From the above  it follows  that excluding certain deposits  (for example,  foreign-
currency  deposits)  from deposit  insurance  coverage  reduces  proportionally  the deposit
insurance  cost,  but  does.  not  affect  the  actuarially  fair  deposit  insurance  premium
(expressed  as percentage  of insured deposits),  unless not covering certain deposits,  such
as  foreign-currency  deposits,  affects  the  asset composition  of the bank  and with  it the
asset risk av  of the bank. In reality, however,  a reduction in insurance  coverage is likely
to  reduce  moral hazard  and  may  therefore  reduce  the  asset  risk  of the  bank  and  the
actuarially fair deposit insurance premium.
In developing countries, banks'  asset risk,  av, tends to be higher on average than
in  developed  countries.  Since  the  per dollar  insurance  premium  is  higher  with  higher
asset risk, limiting the coverage has a larger impact on reducing the total value of deposit
insurance  in  countries  with high bank  asset risk  than  in countries with  low bank  asset
risk.  Limiting the coverage of deposit insurance is therefore an even more important tool
for  controlling  moral  hazard  and  the  cost  of deposit  insurance  in  most  developing
countries  than in most developed countries.
Depending on the percentage of the value of total deposit covered by the deposit
insurance  fund, the premium  expressed per insured deposits can differ substantially  from
the premium expressed per total deposits, as illustrated by Table 6. For countries  that do
not report official premium as a percentage  of insured deposits, but only as  a percentage
of total deposits, we use reported figures on the deposit coverage to translate the reported
32premiums  in estimates  of the premiums expressed  as a percentage  of insured  deposits.
The deposit coverage  and premium  data used to perform these  transformations  are  also
reported in Panel B respectively Panel C of the Annex. Due to data limitations, we cannot
calculate the official premiums as a percentage of insured deposits for all countries. Table
6 only includes those countries for which the premium as a percentage of insured deposits
can  be calculated.  Column  2  in  Table  6  shows  whether  the  insured  deposits  or  total
deposits  (insured plus uninsured  deposits)  are the  premium  assessment base.  Column 3
presents  annual  premiums for flat rate deposit insurance  schemes as a percentage of the
assessment base,  and  as reported by country authorities.  Column 4 shows the  value  of
deposit insurance  coverage  as a percentage  of total deposits.  Column  5 presents  annual
premiums  as a percentage  of insured  deposits.  The table illustrates  that it is important to
know the assessment  base of the premiums,  when looking  at officially  charged  deposit
insurance premiums.
33Table 6  Premium per insured deposit
Column 2 presents the premium assessment base.  Column 3  presents annual premiums for flat rate deposit
insurance  schemes as a percentage  of the assessment  base. Column 4 shows the value of deposit insurance
coverage  as a percentage  of total deposits. Column  5 presents annual premiums  as a percentage  of insured
deposits.  Source: Annex of this paper.
Country  Assessment base  Premium  Deposit  coverage  Premium
For premium  %  of assessment base  %  of value of total deposits  %  of insured deposits
Argentina  Insured deposits  0.66 to 1.02  40.0  0.66-1.02
Bahamas  Insured deposits  0.05  11.5  0.05
Bangladesh  Total deposits  0.01  31.0  0.02
Belgium  Insured deposits  0.02  n.a.  0.02
Brazil  Total deposits  0.30  43.0  0.70
Bulgaria  Insured deposits  0.50  <35.0  0.50
Canada  Insured deposits  0.04 to 0.33  35.9  0.04 to 0.33
Croatia  Insured deposits  0.80  68.0  0.80
Czech Rep.  Insured deposits  0.50  n.a.  0.50
Denmark  Insured deposits  Max. 0.20  <50.0  Max. 0.20
Finland  Insured deposits  0.05 to 0.30  40.0  0.05 to 0.30
Germany  Insured deposits  0.01-0.11  n.a.  0.01-0.11
Guatemala  Insured deposits  1.00  n.a.  1.00
Hungary  Insured deposits  0.16-0.19  48.0  0.16-0.19
Iceland  Insured deposits  0.15  n.a.  0.15
India  Total deposits  0.05  72.0  0.07
Ireland  Insured deposits  0.20  n.a.  0.20
Jamaica  Insured deposits  0.10  33.5  0.10
Japan  Insured deposits  0.08  100.0  0.08
Kazakhstan  Insured deposits  0.13-0.38  n.a.  0.13-0.38
Kenya  Total deposits  0.15  16.0  0.94
Korea  Total deposits  0.05  100.0  0.05
Latvia  Insured deposits  0.30  18.7  0.30
Lithuania  Insured deposits  1.00  44.0  1.00
Macedonia  Insured deposits  0.01-0.03  99.0  0.01-0.03
Mexico  Total deposits  0.40-0.80  100.0  0.40-0.80
Nigeria  Total deposits  0.94  21.0  4.46
Peru  Insured deposits  >0.65  n.a.  >0.65
Portugal  Insured deposits  0.08 to 0.12  n.a.  0.08 to 0.12
Romania  Insured deposits  0.30 to 0.60  n.a.  0.30 to 0.60
Slovak Rep.  Insured deposits  0.10 to 0.30  47.0  0.10 to 0.30
Spain  Insured deposits  0.10  60.0  0.10
Sweden  Insured deposits  Max. 0.50  n.a.  Max.  0.50
Taiwan  Insured deposits  0.05-0.06  45.0  0.05-0.06
Tanzania  Total deposits  0.10  12.0  0.83
Trinidad & Tobago  Total deposits  0.20  34.1  0.59
Turkey  Insured deposits  1.00-1.20  100.0  1.00-1.20
Uganda  Total deposits  0.20  26.0  0.77
Ukraine  Total deposits  0.50  19.0  2.63
United Kingdom  Insured deposits  <0.30  n.a.  <0.30
United States  Insured deposits  0.00-0.27  65.2  0.00-0.27
Venezuela  Insured deposits  2.00  n.a.  2.00
34Deposit insurance  coverage differs substantially across countries.  Coverage limits
average 20,660 US dollars per deposit  for all countries, but range from as low as 120 US
dollars  in the Ukraine  to as high  as 243,520 US dollars  in Norway.  Insurance  coverage
tends  to  increase  with the  level  of economic  development  of the  country.  Naturally,
coverage  levels  are  expected  to  be higher in countries  with higher levels  of economic
development.  When  controlling for  differences  in the  level of per capita  GDP,  there is
less variation  in coverage  across countries.  The coverage  limit-to-per  capita GDP ratio
averages  3.19  for all countries,  1.98  for developed  countries,  and  3.78  for  developing
countries.
The  higher  coverage  in  developed  countries  would  suggest  that  the  price  of
deposit insurance is higher in these countries,  unless these countries  are more effective in
controlling the moral  hazard arising  from a high level of coverage.  For example,  these
countries may be more inclined to install risk-adjusted insurance premiums, co-insurance,
and/or  private  funding  and  administration.  In  what  follows  we  analyze  in more  detail
whether  countries with high insurance coverage  tend to be countries  with high income
levels,  and  whether  these  countries  are more  inclined  to implement  design  features of
deposit insurance systems  that tend to limit moral hazard, such as risk-adjusted insurance
premiums, co-insurance,  and/or private funding and administration.
First,  we  regress  the  insurance  coverage  limit  on  per capita  GDP  and  several
design  features.  The  design  features  are  the  age of the  deposit  insurance  scheme,  a
variable  that indicates  whether  the scheme involves co-insurance  or not, a variable that
indicates whether premiums are risk-adjusted  or not, a variable that. indicates whether the
source  of  funding  is  private  or  not,  and  a  variable  that  indicates  whether  the  fund
administration  is private  or  not. We  include per capita  GDP to control  for the level of
economic development.  The sample includes all countries with explicit deposit insurance
schemes  as of end-2000.  The results  are presented  in colunm  (1)  of Table  7. The table
also presents the correlation matrix of the design features.
The  findings  confirm that coverage limit tends  to increase with per capita GDP.
We also find that coverage tends to higher in countries where deposit insurance  has been
introduced  a  long  time  ago.  However,  the  age  of the  deposit  insurance  fund  is  also
strongly  correlated  with  per  capita  GDP,  suggesting  that  deposit  insurance  has  been
35around for longer on average in rich countries than in poor countries. Next, we find that
coverage tend to be higher in countries  that have installed risk-adjusted premiums. Given
the difficulty of implementing  risk-adjusted premiums,  one would expect that they tend
to be more common  in developed  countries that in developing countries.  However,  the
correlation matrix  does not suggest  such a relation.  Private  funding  and  administration
are not significantly related to insurance coverage  in the regression results, although the
correlation  between  coverage  limit  and  private  fund  administration  is  positive  and
significant.
Next, we use the deposit insurance coverage-to-per  capita GDP ratio as dependent
variable.  Interestingly,  we -find that the coverage  ratio is negatively associated  with per
capita GDP, suggesting that although coverage increases with per. capita GDP, the rate of
increase in coverage is lower than the rate of increase in per capita GDP. In other words,
once  we  control  for  the  level  of  economic  development,  we  actually  find  that  the
insurance coverage is less generous in rich countries than in poor countries.  We also find
that  countries  with  high  coverage  ratios  tend  to  implement  risk-adjusted  premiums,
suggesting  that these  countries  try to  curb the  moral  hazard  arising  from the  generous
level of insurance  coverage.  The  other design  features  do not  appear to be significantly
associated with the coverage ratio.
We  thus find that  (i) deposit  insurance  coverage  is higher  in rich countries,  but
that  (ii)  once  one  controls  for  the  level  of economic  development,  deposit  insurance
coverage  is more generous in poor countries,  and (iii) that countries  with generous levels
of coverage  tend  to  limit  the  cost  of deposit  insurance  through  adjusting  insurance
premiums for risk.
36Table 7  Coverage limit as a function of deposit insurance design features
Panel A presents the regression results of coverage  limit as a function of design features.  Panel B presents
the correlation matrix of several design features  for countries  with explicit deposit insurance as of end-year
2000.  Dependent  variable  in  column  1 is  the  coverage  limit  expressed  in  thousands  of US  dollars.
Dependent variable  in column 2 is the  coverage  limit divided by per capita  GDP, also  referred to as the
coverage ratio. Per capita GDP is expressed  in thousands of US dollars. Age of the scheme refers to the age
of the  deposit  insurance  scheme  and is  calculated  as  2000  minus the  year  when deposit insurance  was
enacted.  Co-insurance  takes value  of one if there  is co-insurance,  and zero if not. Risk-adjusted premiums
takes value of one  if premiums are risk-adjusted,  and zero if not. Private funding takes  value of one if the
source  of  funding  is  private,  and  zero  if  not.  Private  administration  takes  value  one  if the  fund
administration  is private, and zero  otherwise.  Source of the data is Garcia (2000)  and Demirgiiu-Kunt  and
Sobaci (2001).  The  data are presented  in the Annex to this  paper. The number of country  observations  is
67.  Six countries  are deleted from the sample due  to lack of data on any of the regression  variables.  The
remaining  sample is  61  countries.  The correlation  matrix is based on the total  sample of 67  countries.  A
constant  term  was  included,  but  is  not reported.  Heteroskedasticity-constistent  standard  errors  between
brackets.  * indicates  significance  at  a  10%  level.  ** indicates  significance  at a 5%  level.  *** indicates
significance at a 1%  level.
Panel A:  Regression results
Coverage limit  Coverage limit-to-per capita GDP
(1)  (2)
Per capita GDP  ***1.546  ***-0.098
(0.466)  (0.028)
Age of the scheme  **0.594  0.004
(0.293)  (0.027)
Co-insurance  -1.079  -0.668
(7.657)  (0.663)
Risk-adjusted premiums  **13.366  **2.200
(5.813)  (0.988)
Private funding  -23.668  0.179
(14.960)  (0.650)
Private administration  15.135  0.214
(12.661)  (0.735)
R2  0.482  0.202
No. observations  61  61
Panel B:  Correlation matrix
Coverage  Coverage  Per capita  Age of  Co-  Risk-  Private  Private
limit  ratio  GDP  scheme  insurance  adjusted  funding  admin.
Coverage  1.00
limit
Coverage  0.14  1.00
ratio
Per capita  ***0.58  **-0.28  1.00
GDP
Age of  ***0.43  -0.12  ***0.45  1.00
scheme
Co-  0.02  -0.09  0.09  -0.09  1.00
insurance
Risk-  **0.26  **0.27  0.11  0.03  -0.07  1.00
Adjusted
Private  0.02.  -0.17  ***0.41  0.08  **0.31  -0.06  1.00
funding
Private  ***0.40  -0.07  ***0.47  **0.26  0.09  *0.21  **0.26  1.00
admin.
372.3  Risk diversification, risk differentiation and pricing of deposit insurance
It  is  well-known  from  investment  portfolio  theory  that  non-systemic  risk  can  be
diversified  away  by  pooling  different  assets  into  one  portfolio  (see,,  for  example,
Markowitz  1952).  The risk diversification value of an additional  asset relates linearly to
the  covariance  between  the returns  on the  additional  asset  and  the  asset returns  of the
portfolio.  The deposit insurance  analogue to portfolio diversification  is that, unless bank
equity returns are perfectly correlated, the price of deposit insurance of a group of banks
is lower than the sum of the price of deposit insurance for each individual bank.  The risk
diversification potential of a particular bank is greater if the correlation between its equity
returns and the equity returns of the other banks in the group is lower.
More  generally,  the  actuarial  cost  of  insurance  decreases  with  the  pool  of
underlying  assets.  If default  probabilities  are  not perfectly  correlated,  it is cheaper  to
insure a  large pool of assets than a small  pool of assets.  A larger pool of assets is also
more likely to be insurable, because losses occur with a higher degree of randomness and
more  frequently,  and  the  average  loss  amount  upon  loss  occurrence  is  smaller  (see
Berliner,  1982).
The  issue of potential  diversification  of non-systemic  risk  is often  overlooked
when discussing  appropriate pricing levels for deposit insurance  in a country.  Typically,
the  actuarially-fair  price  of deposit  insurance  for a country  is  estimated by  averaging
estimated actuarially fair deposit insurance premiums of individual banks in the country.
From the  above,  it follows  that the cost of insuring  the  deposits of a banking  system is
lower than the sum of the cost of insuring each bank individually. The difference between
the  cost of insuring the system and the sum of the individual  parts is greater if there is
greater  risk  diversification  potential  in  the  country.  Naturally,  the  potential  for  risk
diversification  is larger in larger countries, in countries with many banks, and in countries
with different types of banks (other things being equal).  Therefore,  the deposit insurance
premium  should  be  higher  (or the  insurance  coverage  smaller) in  small  countries,  in
countries  with  few banks,  and  in countries  without  substantial  differentiation  between
banks (and their risk-characteristics).
A more direct way to limit the risk of deposit insurance,  and therefore  its price, is
to  exclude  risky  banks  from the  insurance  contract.  Unless  some of these banks  have
38great diversification  potential because of their covariance matrix structure,  and exclusion
of the risky banks from insurance  can reduce the cost of deposit insurance  significantly.
Of course,  the  success  of this  risk  differentiation  approach  depends  on  the  technical
ability and political will to differentiate between risky banks and not so risky banks.
In  this  section,  we  investigate  the  potential  of risk  diversification  and  risk
differentiation  of banks in the Republic  of Korea.  We  compare RV  (1986)  estimates of
actuarially  fair deposit insurance premiums  for individual banks with their equivalent  for
a group of listed banks in Korea.  The reasons  for focusing on Korea are threefold.  First,
to  apply  the  RV  (1986)  methodology,  we  need  data  on  bank  equity  returns.  Most
commercial  banks  in  Korea  are  listed  and  data  on  their  equity  returns  are  readily
available.  Second, and most importantly, the majority of the Korean commercial banking
system consists of listed banks,  so that the portfolio  of listed banks  is a good proxy for
the overall commercial  banking  system.  Ideally,  one would want to  look at all banks in
the  country  when  assessing  the  potential  of  risk  diversification  in  the  country.
Unfortunately, there is no country where all banks are listed. Korea is one of the best case
studies from this perspective.
We  collect  daily  market  data  and  annual  balance  sheet  data  on  all  listed
commercial  banks in Korea for the year  1999 from Bankscope  and Datastream.  Data on
the total commercial banking system come from the Korean Central Bank. A summary of
the data is presented  in Table 8. We estimate annual equity volatility from weekly equity
returns  expressed  in  US  dollars,  and  follow  Fama's  (1965)  suggestion  to  delete  days
when  the  Korean  stock  exchange  is  closed.  We  also  delete  observations  for  days  on
which large jumps in share  prices occur.  Such observations  may be  due to restructuring
or  merger  announcements.  Inclusion  of  such  observations  would  overestimate  the
volatility of equity returns.
Table 8 confirms that the group of listed banks  comprises  a large part of the total
commercial  banking  system  in  Korea.  In  terms  of total  assets,  the  thirteen  listed
commercial banks in Korea account for 81.8 percent of total commercial banking system
assets. The share of listed banks in total commercial bank deposits is even slightly higher
with  82.5  percent.  This  means  that the  group  of listed banks  in Korea  is a reasonable
proxy for the entire commercial banking system in Korea,  so that the risk diversification
39potential  embedded in the group of listed banks (and the corresponding  saving in the cost
of deposit insurance) approximates the risk diversification potential of the country.
The  average  equity volatility  weighted by equity market  values  is  80.1  percent,
which  is  substantially  larger than the  equity volatility  of the portfolio  of stocks  of the
thirteen  listed  banks  reported  in Table  8 of 56.2 percent.  The total equity  volatility  is
lower than the average equity volatility due to imperfect  correlation of the equity returns
of the sampled banks.
Table 9 presents the correlation  matrix between the equity returns.  The table shows
that there  is a  large variation  in the equity return  correlations  of different  banks.  Some
equity return correlations  are close to zero.19 These correlations  suggest that the potential
for risk diversification among Korea banks is substantial.20
This is confirmed when we compare RV (1986) estimates of actuarially fair deposit
insurance  premiums for the individual banks with their equivalent for the total  group of
listed banks in Korea.  Table 10 shows that the average  actuarially fair premium for listed
banks is 2.81  percent of deposits  (weighted  by total  deposits), while  the actuarially  fair
premium of insuring the portfolio of all banks is only 1.44 percent of deposits.  The total
value of deposit insurance drops from 8.3  billion US dollars to 4.2 billion US dollars.  In
other words, diversifying  non-systemic risk by insuring the deposits of all banks via the
same  contract  (a  typical  explicit deposit  insurance  contract)  almost halves  the deposit
insurance premiums, as compared to insuring banks via individual contracts.
In estimating actuarially fair deposit insurance premiums, we assume a forbearance
parameter  of 0.95.  This  is  slightly lower  than the corresponding  figure  of 0.97  in RV
(1986). Our setup is intended to reflect the difference in the expected level of forbearance
between  the US, the country under investigation  in RV (1986), and Korea.  The Republic
of Korea  recently  experienced  a  financial  crisis  and  has  arguably  a  weaker  level  of
government enforcement and greater fiscal weakness than the US.
Next, we investigate the potential for risk reduction achieved by excluding the three
riskiest banks in terms of equity volatility from the insurance contract. These three banks
19 For examnple,  the correlation between the equity returns of Korea First Bank and Kyongnam Bank is only
0.08, and the correlation between the equity returns of Korea First Bank and Housing and Cormmercial
Bank is even slightly negative at -0.02.
20 As the equity return correlations  are unlikely to be stable over time, our quantitative results are sensitive
to the sampled time period. However,  our qualitative result does not alter.
40are  highlighted  in  italics  in  Table  8  and  include  Hanvit  Bank  (with  an  equity  return
volatility  of 90  percent),  Korea  First  Bank  (with  an  equity  return  volatility  of  120
percent) and Seoul Bank (with an equity return volatility of 124 percent).  The share of the
remaining ten banks in the assets of the total Korean commercial banking  system drops to
58  percent.  Note  that  one  of these  banks,  Korea  First  Bank,  is  a bank with  large risk
diversification  potential,  as  reflected  by the  low correlation  of its  equity  returns  with
some of the other Korean banks. Nevertheless,  we find that exclusion of these banks of
above-average  risk further reduces  the  risk of the  portfolio  and therefore  the  actuarially
fair  deposit  insurance  premium.  The  estimate  of the  actuarially  fair  deposit  insurance
premium for the portfolio of ten remaining banks is 1.28 percent of deposits.
The  above  mentioned  actuarially  fair  deposit  insurance  premiums  have  been
estimated  under the  assumption  that  all debt  is insured.  Next,  we  carry  out  an extreme
debt-structure  experiment  where  we assume  that  all  non-deposit  debt is subordinated  to
deposits.21 Although  in  reality  it  is  quite  likely  that  all  bank  creditors  in  Korea  were
implicitly guaranteed by the government during the  year  1999, so that insured bank debt
equals  total  bank  debt,  this  experiment  highlights  the  potential  reduction  in  costs  if
insurance  and  bailouts  were  to  be  strictly  limited  to  bank  deposits,  and  non-deposit
creditors hold junior debt.
With non-deposit debt subordinated,  the estimated actuarially fair deposit insurance
premiums  reduce  further.  Under  this  setup,  insuring  the  deposits  of the  thirteen  banks
carries  a  price  of only 0.39 percent  of deposits  (see  column  4  in Table  10).  When  the
three "risky"  banks  are  excluded,  the  estimated  actuarially  fair premium  further reduces
to  0.33  percent  of deposits.  The  latter is  dramatically  lower than the  original  weighted
average  of 2.81  percent of deposits.
This section  has  shown  that  the  potential  for risk diversification  should  be taken
into account  when considering  an appropriate  level for the deposit insurance premium  of
a  country.  Countries  with  little  diversification  of risk  should  charge  higher  deposit
insurance  premiums.  We have also shown that premiums can be set substantially lower if
countries (have the option to) exclude risky banks from the deposit insurance system.
21  In other words, we assume that non-deposit  debt is junior to the deposit insurance agency claim and we
classify such debt as equity. In effect, the bank's debt is made coterminous with deposits, and therefore the
price of deposit insurance is reduced.  See also Hovakimian  and Kane (2000).
41Table 8  Korean bank data as of end-1999
The following  table  shows bank-specific  data  for listed banks in the Republic  of Korea as of end-1999. Values  are in millions of US dollars,  unless  otherwise
noted. Equity volatility is annualized volatility, based on weekly equity returns (i.e., weekly equity volatility times the square root of 52).  In italics are the banks
the three riskiest banks according  to equity volatility. Individual  bank data come from Bankscope  and Datastream.  Total commercial  banking  system data from
the Korean Central Bank. Column (1)  presents total  banks assets.  Column (2) presents bank deposits.  Column (3)  presents total bank debt.  Column (4) presents
the mnarket  value of equity.  Column (5)  presents  the volatility  of equity.  Column  (6) shows  the dividend  paid.  Column  (7) presents  the  debt-to-equity  ratio.
Column  (8) presents the ratio of deposits to (equity plus non-deposit debt), also equal to the ratio of deposits to (assets minus deposits).
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Total Assets  Deposits  Total debt  MV equity  Equity  Dividend paid  Debt-over-  Deposits/
Bank Name  (mln  US$)  (mln  US$)  (mln US$)  (mn  US$)  volatility (%)  (nln US$)  Equity  (Assets-Deposits)
Chohung Bank  40,815  29,910  38,900  2,200  69.8  0  17.7  2.7
Daegu Bank  10,352  8,190  9,874  344  68.6  0  28.7  4.0
H&C Bank  42,495  31,418  40,615  3,126  68.3  58.8  13.0  2.5
Hana Bank  32,088  25,251  30,408  854  79.2  45.5  35.6  4.2
Hanvit  Bank  63,581  55,371  61,245  2,941  90.4  0  20.8  6.3
Kookmnin Bank  63,715  46,692  60,652  4,670  72.3  14.8  13.0  2.5
Koranm Bank  19,991  15,454  19,119  736  73.6  0  26.0  3.5
Korea First  Bank  24,794  18,972  23,937  741  120.0  0  32.2  3.3
Kwangju Bank  6,179  4,966  6,051  150  77.9  0  40.4  4.0
KyongnamBank  7,059  5,393  6,743  163  80.5  0  41.4  3.6
Pusan Bank  8,773  7,564  8,422  194  79.1  0  43.5  7.2
Seoul Bank  21,203  18,178  20,290  .325  124.4  0  62.3  7.5
Shinhan Bank  37,223  26,598  34,673  2,646  72.6  0  13.1  2.5
Total (13) all  listed banks  378,267  293,957  360,928  19,088  56.2  119.1  18.9  3.4
Total commercial banking system  462,519  356,390
Percentage of total system  81.8  82.5
Total (10) excluding 3 riskiest
banks  268,690  201,437  255,456  15,081  55.2  119.1  16.9  2.9
Percentage of total system  58.1  56.5
42Table 9  Correlation matrix of weekly  equity returns in US dollars for the year 1999
This table presents the correlation matrix of equity returns for listed banks in the Republic of Korea.  Correlations are based on weekly stock returns in US dollars
for the year 1999.
Chohung  Daegu  Hana  Hanvit  H & C  Kookmin  Koram  Korea first  Kwangju  Kyongnam  Pusan  Seoul  Shinhan
Chohung  1.00
Daegu  0.53  1.00
Hana  0.46  0.59  1.00
Hanvit  0.39  0.42  0.58  1.00
H & C  0.26  0.48  0.50  0.41  1.00
Kookmin  0.46  0.63  0.61  0.59  0.63  1.00
Koram  0.41  0.65  0.76  0.56  0.60  0.71  1.00
Korea first  0.45  0.33  0.18  0.17  -0.02  0.23  0.32  1.00
Kwangju  0.56  0.78  0.52  0.47  0.46  0.69  0.57  0.31  1.00
Kyongnamn  0.45  0.75  0.39  0.33  0.45  0.61  0.50  0.08  0.80  1.00
Pusan  0.46  0.81  0.46  0.39  0.25  0.53  0.53  0.29  0.81  0.74  1.00
Seoul  0.56  0.42  0.20  0.31  0.18  0.35  0.39  0.80  0.42  0.32  0.35  1.00
Shinhan  0.46  0.58  0.67  0.42  0.51  0.68  0.72  0.28  0.55  0.49  0.39  0.30  1.00
43Table 10  Effect of risk diversification  and exclusion  of risky banks on  deposit insurance premiums
This table presents  RV (1986)  estimates  of actuarially  fair  deposit  insurance premiums  for Korean banks.  These  values of the deposit insurance  guarantee are
expressed in US dollars  and as a percentage  of deposits. We  assume a forbearance parameter of  p=0.95, and a constant annual dividend yield.  Individual  bank
data ftom Bankscope  and Datastrean.  Data are  as of end-1999.  The implied premiums  in columns (2) and (3)  assume  that all bank debt is insured.  The  implied
premiums in columns (4) and (5)  assume that non-deposit bank debt is subordinated  and set equal to equity, as in Hovakirnian  and Kane (2000, Table V). Panel
A presents  the weighted  average premium for all banks (weighted by bank deposits) and the implied premium for the portfolio of all banks. Panel B excludes  the
three most risky banks according to their equity volatility, i.e., Hanvit Bank, Korea First Bank, and Seoul Bank. Panel B presents for this sub-sample of banks the
weighted average premium (weighted by bank deposits) and the implied premium for the portfolio of  these banks.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
All bank debt is insured  Non-deposit bank debt is subordinated
Deposits  Insurance premium  Value of  deposit insurance  Insurance premium  Value of deposit insurance
Bank Name  (mln USD)  (in % of deposits)  (mln USD)  (in % of deposits)  (mln USD)
Chohung Bank  29,910  1.52  455  1.01  303
Daegu Bank  8,190  2.07  170  0.98  80
H&C Bank  31,418  1.86  585  1.07  338
Hana Bank  25,251  6.84  1,726  2.89  729
Hanvit Bank  55,371  2.71  1,503
Kookmin Bank  46,692  1.52  712  1.28  599
KoramBank  15,454  2.11  326  1.34  206
Korea First  Bank  18,972  5.10  967
Kwangju Bank  4,966  2.84  141  1.72  85
KyongnamBank  5,393  2.93  158  1.99  107
Pusan Bank  7,564  2.98  226  1.78  135
Seoul Bank  18,178  5.01  910
Shinhan Bank  26,598  1.46  388  1.22  324
Panel A: All banks
Weighted average  2.81  8,265  2.73  8,221
Total (13 banks)  293,957  1.44  4,228  0.39  1,146
Panel B: Excl. risky banks
Weighted average  2.43  4,886  1.43  2,906
Total (10 banks)  201,437  1.28  2,570  0.33  671
443. Is Deposit Insurance Underpriced Around the World?
The  ultimate  question  on  the  pricing  of deposit  insurance  in  a  particular  country  is
whether  deposit  insurance  is  priced  correctly.  In  this  section  we  employ  some  of the
methods  presented in section  1 to address this question.  More  specifically,  we focus on
the option-pricing  method  and the  expected  loss pricing  method.  Since  the  outcome  of
over- or underpricing is highly sensitive to the model specifications, we choose the model
parameters  such  that  these  alternative  models  give  "conservative"  estimates,  i.e.,
estimates that are likely to underestimate the true cost of deposit insurance.
In  the  case  of option-pricing  models,  we  generate  conservative  estimates  of the
price  of deposit insurance  by not allowing  for regulatory  forbearance.  As mentioned  in
section  1.1,  there exist  several  reasons  why Merton's  (1977)  option-pricing  model  of
deposit  insurance  gives  downward  biased  estimates  of the benefits  bank  stockholders
derive  from the safety net. One possible reason is that the level of regulatory forbearance
is  underestimated.  Although  RV  (1986)  incorporate  capital  forbearance  by  the  bank
regulators by permitting asset values  to deteriorate to 97 percent of the value of bank debt
before  the bank is closed,  the level of regulatory control  is unknown  ex ante.  It is quite
plausible  that  the  level  of regulatory  forbearance  is  much higher  in certain  countries,
notably developing countries, than suggested by the setup in the RV (1986) model, where
a forbearance  parameter of 0.97 is assumed.  Other reasons why the option-pricing model
is  likely  to  give  downward  biased  estimates  of the  price  of deposit  insurance  are  the
assumption of prompt option settlement and the assumption that no agency conflicts arise
from  the enforcement  of regulatory  requirements.  For these reasons,  we  argue  that  the
RV  (1986)  model  without  capital  forbearance  generates  conservative  estimates  of the
actuarially fair price of deposit insurance.  For comparison purposes,  we also use the RV
(1986) model  with a forbearance  parameter  of 0.97 to get less  conservative  estimates of
the actuarially fair price of deposit insurance.
In the case of expected  loss pricing methods, we generate  conservative  estimates
of the  price  of deposit  insurance  by  assuming  low  loss  rates  on  bank  assets.  More
specifically,  we set the loss rate on bank  assets  equal to the US historical  average of 8
percent,  which  is  likely  to  be  a  too  low  figure  for  most  countries,  in particular  for
45countries with a weak insolvency framework such as many developing  countries.  We use
country  and bank  credit  ratings  to  generate  estimates  for  the expected  loss  rates.  The
basic setup is identical to the one presented in Table 4, Panel A in Section 1.
A consistent  comparison of cross-country premiums  should be based on deposit
insurance  premiums  expressed  as  a percentage  of insured deposits,  because  this  figure
does not depend on the deposit coverage, but only on the amount of total debt. Depending
on the percentage of the value of total deposit covered by the deposit insurance fund, the
premium  expressed  per  insured  deposits  can  differ  substantially  from  the  premium
expressed per total  deposits.  We use the official premiums  (re)stated as a percentage  of
insured deposits and reported in Table 6.
The procedure for transforming credit ratings into expected  loss rates has already
been explained  in great detail  in  section  1. Table  11  presents  estimates  of the expected
loss rates for different  categories of Moody's credit ratings using loss rates on assets of 8
percent or  50 percent.  The 8 percent  loss rate represents  the US historical  average.  The
expected losses  loss rates presented in Table  11 are generated using the same framework
and  under  the  same  assumptions  as  those  presented  earlier  in Panel  A of Table  4  in
Section  1. Column (3)  in Table  11  presents  the expected  loss rates under the assumption
of loss  rates  on assets of 8  percent,  while  column  (4) presents  the  expected  loss  rates
under the assumption of loss rates on  assets of 50 percent.  The estimates  in column  (3)
serve as a conservative estimate of the actuarially fair premium of deposit insurance.  The
estimates in column  (4) are less conservative.  The estimates  in column (3)  and (4) differ
only in the assumed loss rate on assets.  Since expected loss rates  are proportional  to the
loss  rates  on  assets  (other  things  equal),  the  expected  loss  rates  calculated  under  the
assumption of 50 percent loss rates on assets are 50-over-8  times higher than the expected
losses calculated under the assumption of 8 percent loss rates on assets.
The  expected  loss  rates  per  deposit  derived  under  the  assumption  of the  US
historical  average  loss rate  on  assets  of 8 percent  and  presented  in  Table  11  show  a
similar range  of values  as  the actual  assessment  rates of FDIC-insured  deposit-taking
institutions in the US. Table  12 presents the assessment rates  for such institutions for the
46year 2001  by supervisory  group  and capital  group.  Supervisory  group  A denotes  better
quality than supervisory group B, and group B denotes better quality than group C. 22
Table 11  Expected Loss Pricing using Credit Ratings
Column 3 reports expected  loss rates by credit rating under the assumption of a 8 percent loss rate on assets
and a deposit to assets ratio  of 75 percent. Column  3  reports expected  loss rates by credit rating under the
assumption of a  50 percent  loss  rate on  assets and a deposit  to assets ratio  of 75 percent.  The "Average
cumulative  default  rate for 5 years  (1920-99)"  is taken from Exhibit  31,  Moody's  Historical  Default  Rates
of Corporate  Bond Issuers,  1920-1999, January 2000.  The 8 percent loss rate on assets equals the historical
loss rate on assets for US banks with assets larger than US$ 5 billion, and is taken from US, FDIC (2001).
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Average cumulative  Expected loss  Expected loss
Moody's  default rate for 5 years  8% loss rate on assets  50% loss rate on assets
credit rating  (1920-99)  Deposits/Assets  (% of deposits)  (% of deposits)
Aaa  0.20%  75.00%  0.00%  0.03%
Aal-Aa3  0.36%  75.00%  0.01%  0.05%
Al-A3  0.55%  75.00%  0.01%  0.07%
Baal-Baa3  1.97%  75.00%  0.04%  0.26%
Bal-Ba3  12.88%  75.00%  0.27%  1.72%
B1-B3  30.16%  75.00%  0.64%  4.02%
Caal-C3  43.37%  75.00%  0.93%  5.78%
While  the  FDIC  premiums  range  from  zero  to  0.27  percent  of insured  deposits,  the
Moody's ratings  implied premiums  (under the  assumption of 8 percent  loss rates)  range
from zero  to  0.93  percent  of insured  deposits.  Considering  that  the  Moody's  ratings  of
large banks in the US range  from Aa to Ba, the Moody's ratings implied premiums  for a
significant  part  of the  US  banking  system  range  from  0.1  percent  to  0.27  percent  of
insured deposits,  very similar to  the actual FDIC pricing  schedule of 0.0 percent to 0.27
percent of insured  deposits.  These results  do not indicate  that deposit insurance  is priced
correctly  in the  US,  but merely  seem  to  suggest that  the expected  loss  pricing method
gives reasonable  estimates of the price of deposit insurance.
22 As defined by the FDIC: Supervisory  group A consists of financially sound institutions with a few minor
weaknesses and generally corresponds  to the primary federal regulator's composite rating of 1 or 2 (1 being
the highest rating).  Supervisory group B consists of institutions that demonstrate weaknesses,  which, if not
corrected, could results in significant deterioration of the institutions. This group generally corresponds to
the primary federal regulator's composite rating of 3. Supervisory group C consists of institutions that pose
a substantial probability loss to the deposit insurer unless effective corrective action is taken.  This group
generally corresponds to the primary federal regulator's composite  rating of 4 or 5.
47Table 12  Assessment  Rate Schedule of FDIC-Insured Institutions, 2001
This table presents the assessment rate schedule of the U.S. FDIC risk-based assessment system as of end-
2001. Assessment rates  are by supervisory  group and capital group. Rates are annual  and are  expressed in
percentage points per insured deposits.
Supervisory group
A  B  C
co  Well-capitalized  0.00  0.03  0.17
0
Eq  Adequately-capitalized  0.03  0.10  0.24
u  Under-capitalized  0.10  0.24  0.27
Next,  we  compare  the  conservative  estimates  of the  actuarially  fair  price  of
deposit insurance  with the actually charged  premiums in countries  around the world.  If
the conservative estimate of the true cost of deposit insurance  is higher than the officially
charged premium, we argue that deposit insurance  is underpriced. Table  13 presents both
the official premiums and the conservative  estimates  of actuarially fair premiums based
on credit ratings  and  option prices.  We  use both country and  bank  credit ratings  from
Moody's  to estimate expected loss rates. The country credit rating acts as a ceiling of the
rating  for (most) banks  in the country.  In several  countries,  country  risk is so  dominant
that bank ratings equal the country rating.  Since we focus on expected  loss rates on bank
deposits we use the Moody's ratings  for long-term bank deposits.  For countries,  we use
Moody's  ratings  on  foreign-currency  denominated  long-term  bank  deposits.  For
individual  banks, we use  Moody's  ratings on long-term  bank  deposits  (including  both
local-currency  and foreign-currency denominated  deposits).23
Column  (1)  in  Table  13  presents  the  country  rating  on  foreign-currency
denominated,  long-term bank deposits. Column (2) presents the median of the ratings on
long-term  bank  deposits  for  individual  banks.  The  median  is  taken  across  Moody's
universe  of rated  banks  in the  country  (see  Moody's,  2001).  Column  (3)  reports  the
actually charged  deposit insurance premiums in the country.  These official premiums are
expressed as a percentage of insured deposits, and are taken from Table 6.
23 Moody's deposit obligations ratings are issuer (rather than issue) ratings. For US banks, this rating
applies only to domestic deposit obligations. For non-US banks, the deposit obligation rating applies to all
deposit obligations.
48The next four columns  in Table  13  present the credit rating implied estimates of
the  price of deposit  insurance.  Column  (4) presents  the  country  credit  rating  implied
premium under the assumption of a 8 percent loss rate on assets. The country credit rating
is  also  expressed  as  a percentage  of insured  deposits.  For  consistency  with  the  actual
premiums,  all implied premiums  are expressed  as a percentage of insured  deposits.  The
country rating implied premiums in column (4) are our most conservative  estimates of the
actuarially  fair price of deposit insurance, because  they assume a low  loss rate on assets
of 8 percent and because they use the credit rating of the country which is at least as good
as the (median) credit rating of banks in the country. Column  (5) presents the bank credit
rating  implied  estimates  of the  actuarially  fair  deposit  insurance  premium  under  the
assumption  of a 8 percent loss  rate on assets.  This country-level  estimate is a weighted
average  of the  bank  credit  rating  implied  estimates  for  individual  banks  in  Moody's
universe  of rated  banks  in  the  country.  These  estimates  correspond  therefore  to  the
default probabilities  implied by the median bank credit ratings presented in column  (2).
Column (6) presents the country credit rating implied premium under the assumption of a
50  percent  loss rate on  assets.  These  estimates  differ  from  the estimates  in column  (4)
only in the assumed loss rate, and are therefore a factor 50-over-8  larger than the implied
premiums in column (4). Column (7) presents the bank credit rating implied estimates of
the actuarially fair deposit insurance premium under the assumption of a 50 percent loss
rate on assets.  Similarly, these estimates  are a factor 50-over-8  larger than the premiums
in column  (5).  The  implied  premiums  in  columns  (6)  and (7)  use higher  loss  rates  on
assets  and are therefore less conservative  than the estimates  in columns (4)  and  (5), but
possibly more realistic in the case of some countri'es.
The last two columns in Table  13 present the option-pricing  implied estimates of
actuarially fair deposit insurance premiums. Column (8)  presents the RV (1986) estimates
under the assumption  of no forbearance  (i.e.,  using a forbearance  parameter  of p=l.00).
Column  (9)  presents  the  RV  (1986)  estimates  under  the  assumption  of substantial
forbearance  (equivalent  to  a  forbearance  parameter  of p=0.97. in their model).  The  RV
(1986)  implied  deposit  insurance  premiums  are  from  Hovakimian,  Kane  and  Laeven
(2002). These  estimates  are based on stock market and balance  sheet data on a sample of
49listed banks  in each  of the reported  countries,  and are  averages  for the period  1991-99.
We do not haye estimates for a number of countries due to lack of data.
Despite  the  fact  that we  calculate  rather  conservative  estimates  of the  price  of
deposit insurance,  we find that these estimates  are still higher than the officially  charged
premiums  in  a  number  of countries.  In  the  case  of Bulgaria,  India  and  Jamaica,  the
actually  charged  premiums  are  even  lower  than  the  country  credit  rating  implied
premiums reported in column (4) - our most conservative estimates of the cost of deposit
insurance.  In  Korea  and  Romania,  the  actual  premiums  levied  are  lower  than  the
premiums implied by median bank credit in the country reported in column (5).24  Based
on less conservative estimates of the cost of deposit insurance that assume a loss rate on
assets of 50 percent  (reported in columns (6)  and (7)), one would conclude  that deposit
insurance  is underpriced  in a large  number  of countries,  most of which  are  developing
countries.
The actuarially fair deposit insurance premiums implied by the RV (1986) option-
pricing  model  also  suggest  underpricing  in  several  countries.  When  allowing  for
forbearance  (to  the  equivalent  p=0.97  in  the RV  model),  the  implied  premiums  are
higher  than  the  actual  premiums  in  the  following  countries:  Bangladesh,  Brazil,
Germany,  Hungary,  India, Japan,  Kenya,  and Korea. More conservative  estimates based
on the assumption  of no  forbearance  still suggest  underpricing  of deposit  insurance  in
Bangladesh,  Brazil, India,  Japan and Korea.
In sum, we find using two different methods of pricing deposit insurance  that the
actual  premiums  levied  on  banks  are  lower  than  the  premiums  implied  by  these
theoretical  models in many countries.  Given that we have used different models and have
set model  parameters  such that these models produce  conservative  estimates  of the true
cost of deposit  insurance  (in  many  countries,  forbearance  may well  exceed  the  level
implied by p=0.97,  and loss rates on assets may well exceed 50 percent),  one could argue
that deposit insurance  is underpriced  in many countries around the world. In particular in
24 These implied figures are likely to be underestimates of the true cost of deposit insurance in many
countries, not only because we assume a low loss rate on assets of 8 percent, but also because rated banks
tend to be the "better quality" banks in the country, so that the median rating would overestimate  the
average  quality of bank assets.
50most  developing  countries,  where  the  ability  to  control  bank  risk  tends  to  be  weak,
underpricing of deposit insurance is likely to be greater than estimated here.
For  many countries,  we  find  such  high  levels  of actuarially  fair  premiums  as  5
percent  or  more  of deposits.  Few  banks  would  be  able  to  afford  such  high  deposit
insurance  premiums.  Our  estimates  thus  suggest  that  many of these  countries  cannot
afford deposit insurance,  in particular countries with weak banks and institutions.  This is
another  way  of saying  that  countries  with  weak  institutions  should  not  adopt  explicit
deposit insurance.
51Table 13  Official Premiums and Conservative  Estimates of Fair Premiums Based  on Credit Ratings and Option Prices
Column (1) presents  the country rating on foreign-currency  denominated,  long-term  bank deposits  as of end-year 2001.  Column  (2) presents the median of the
ratings on long-term  bank deposits for individual banks as  of end-year 2001.  The  source of the credit ratings  is Moody's  Investors  Service (2001).  Column (3)
reports the actually  charged deposit  insurance  premiums  in the country  as a percentage of insured deposits.  The source of these  figures  is Table  6. Column (4)
presents  the country  credit rating  implied premium  as  a percentage  of insured  deposits under  the  assumption  of a  8 percent  loss  rate on  assets.  Column  (5)
presents the bank credit rating implied estimates of the actuarially fair deposit insurance premium as a percentage of insured deposits under the assumption of a 8
percent loss rate  on assets.  Column (6)  presents  the country  credit rating implied premium  as  a percentage of insured deposits under the  assumption  of a  50
percent loss rate  on assets.  Column (7)  presents  the bank  credit  rating implied estimates  of the actuarially  fair deposit  insurance  premium as a percentage  of
insured  deposits  under the assumption  of a 50 percent  loss  rate  on  assets.  Column  (8)  presents  the RV  (1986)  (RV)  implied  estimates  of deposit  insurance
premiums  as  a percentage  of insured  deposits  under the  assumption  of no  forbearance.  Column  (9) presents the RV  implied  estimates  of deposit insurance
premiums as  a percentage  of insured deposits under the assumption  of substantial forbearance  (equivalent to a forbearance parameter of p=0.97). The source  of
RV (1986) implied deposit insurance premiums is Hovakimian, Kane and Laeven (2002). These  are averages for the period  1991-99.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Credit Rating Implied Premium  Option Pricing Implied Premium
Country rating  Bank rating  Country  rating  Bank rating  RV implied  RV implied
Country  Bank  Actual  implied premium  implied premium implied premium implied premium premium - no premium - with
Country  rating  rating  Premium  - 8% loss rate  - 8% loss rate-  50% loss rate - 50% loss rate  forbearance  forbearance
Argentina  Caa3  Caa3  0.66-1.02  0.93  0.93  5.78  5.78  0.36  0.58
Bahamas  A3  n.a.  0.05  0.01  n.a.  0.07  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Bangladesh  n.a.  n.a.  0.02  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.07  0.77
Belgium  Aaa  Aa3  0.02  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.05  n.a.  n.a.
Brazil  B2  B2  0.70  0.64  0.64  4.02  4.02  0.92  1.70
Bulgaria  B3  n.a.  0.50  0.64  n.a.  4.02  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Canada  Aal  Aa3  0.04 to 0.33  0.01  0.01  0.05  0.05  0.01  0.14
Croatia  Bal  Bal  0.80  0.27  0.27  1.72  1.72  n.a.  n.a.
Czech Rep.  Baal  Baal  0.50  0.04  0.04  0.26  0.26  0.06  0.32
Denmark  Aaa  Aa3  Max.  0.20  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.06  0.09  0.18
Finland  Aaa  Aa3  0.05 to 0.30  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.06  0.01  0.11
Germany  Aaa  Aa3  0.01-0.11  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.05  0.00  0.15
Guatemala  Ba3  n.a.  1.00  0.27  n.a.  1.72  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Hungary  A3  A3  0.16-0.19  0.01  0.02  0.07  0.11  0.08  0.42
Iceland  Aa3  A3  0.15  0.01  0.01  0.05  0.05  n.a.  n.a.
52(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Credit Rating Implied Premium  Option Pricing Implied Premium
Country rating  Bank rating  Country  rating  Bank rating  RV implied  RV implied
Country  Bank  Actual  implied premium implied premium implied premium  implied premium premium  - no premium - with
Country  rating  rating  Premium  -8%  loss rate  -8%  loss rate-  50% loss rate - 50%  loss rate  forbearance  forbearance
India  Ba3  Ba3  0.07  0.27  0.27  1.72  1.72  0.19  0.60
Ireland  Aaa  A2  0.20  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.07  0.00  0.02
Jamaica  Bi  n.a.  0.10  0.64  n.a.  4.02  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Japan  Aal  A3  0.08  0.01  0.03  0.05  0.16  0.09  0.42
Kazakhstan  Ba3  Ba3  0.13-0.38  0.27  0.27  1.72  1:72  na.  n.a.
Kenya  n.a.  n.a.  0.94  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.71  1.02
Korea  Baa3  Bal  0.05  0.04  0.20  0.26  1.27  0.28  0.85
Latvia  Baa3  Bal  0.30  0.04  0.16  0.26  0.99  n.a.  n.a.
Lithuania  Ba2  n.a.  1.00  0.27  n.a.  1.72  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Macedonia  n.a.  n.a.  0.01-0.03  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Mexico  Bal  Bal  0.40-0.80  0.27  0.27  1.72  1.72  n.a.  n.a.
Nigeria  n.a.  n.a.  4.46  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Peru  BI  Bi  >0.65  0.64  0.64  4.02  4.02  0.35  0.67
Portugal  Aaa  Al  0.08 to 0.12  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.10  0.01  0.06
Romania  Caal  Caal  0.30 to 0.60  0.93  0.93  5.78  5.78  n.a.  n.a.
Slovak Rep.  Bal  Bal  0.10toO.30  0.27  0.27  1.72  1.72  n.a.  n.a.
Spain  Aaa  Al  0.10  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.07  0.05  0.07
Sweden  Aal  Aa3  Max. 0.50  0.01  0.01  0.05  0.05  0.02  0.21
Taiwan  Aa3  A3  0.05-0.06  0.01  0.02  0.05  0.14  0.02  0.06
Tanzania  n.a.  n.a.  0.83  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Trinidad & Tobago  Bal  n.a.  0.59  0.27  n.a.  1.72  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Turkey  B3  B3  1.00-1.20  0.64  0.64  4.02  4.02  n.a.  n.a.
Uganda  n.a.  n.a.  0.77  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Ukraine  Caal  Caal  2.63  0.93  0.93  5.78  5.78  n.a.  n.a.
United Kingdom  Aaa  Al  <0.30  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.11  0.01  0.09
United States  Aaa  Aa3  0.00-0.27  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.20  0.00  0.01
Venezuela  B3  B3  2.00  0.64  0.64  4.02  4.02  n.a.  n.a.
534. Summary and Concluding Remarks
In  section  1, we  have  described  alternative  methods  to  price  the  value  of  deposit
insurance.  Each of these methods builds  on one of two theoretical  frameworks:  Merton's
(1977)  option-pricing  model  or the  expected  loss  pricing approach.  The  first approach
relies on  market information  on  equity values  of banks  and  its  application  is therefore
limited to listed banks and to countries with well-developed  capital markets.  The second
approach  can  also be applied if market-based  information  is not available,  for instance,
by using  accounting-based  information  or credit  ratings.  Of course,  when applying  the
second  approach  to  market-based  information,  such  as  yields  on  debentures  issued  by
banks, its application is also limited by the availability and quality of information on such
securities.  For  these  reasons,  practical  models  of pricing  deposit  insurance  typically
embed  both  market-based  and  accounting-based  information.  Nevertheless,  the
application  of such market-based  models is deemed  to be  important. Not  only are  these
models  to be preferred  to  models that do not use market information  from a theoretical
.point of view,  but they can  also  be  used to  create  estimates  of actuarially  fair  deposit
insurance  premiums for the banks in a particular country that could serve  as a benchmark
for the contributions  of banks required to  cover  the expected  losses from bank  failures,
even  though  such  estimates  are  restricted  to  a  limited  sub-sample  of all  banks  in  the
country.  Given  different  values  for the  models  input parameters,  the  tables  in section  1
report  estimates  of such  actuarially  fair premiums.  These  tables  can  easily be used  as
ready-reckoners  by policymakers  to assess the adequateness of existing deposit insurance
premiums for different banks.
The actuarially fair price of deposit insurance is affected by several structure  and
design  features  of a deposit insurance  system.  In  section  2,  we have  presented  several
examples  and studied several cases to document  how different  design features of deposit
insurance  affect  its  pricing  structure.  In  particular,  we  have  focused  on  the  relation
between  deposit  insurance  coverage  and  the  price  of deposit  insurance,  and  how  risk
diversification  and risk differentiation  within a deposit insurance  system can reduce  the
price of deposit insurance.
54In section 2, we have also drawn the attention to an issue that is often overlooked,
namely the potential to  diversify non-systemic  risk among a pool of insured deposits  of
different banks.  Because of such risk diversification,  the cost of insuring the deposits of a
banking system is lower than the sum of the cost of insuring each bank separately.
The discussions  and  findings in section  2 indicates  which design  features  could
help  avoid  the  excessive  costs  arising  from  informational  asymmetries  and principal-
agent  problems  that  are  associated  with  deposit  insurance.  However,  the  objective  of
governments  that implement  deposit  insurance  is generally  not to minimize  such costs,
but rather to achieve social goals such as protecting  small depositors or enhancing public
confidence  and stability of the financial  system.  Most of these objectives,  however,  can
also  be  reached  with  limited  cost  of  deposit  insurance.  Clearly,  the  design  and
implementation  of a deposit insurance scheme should fit country-specific  circumstances,
but  certain  "good  practices"  arise  that  can  substantially  limit  the  cost  of  deposit
insurance.  To  avoid  adverse  selection,  membership  of the  deposit  insurance  scheme
should be  compulsory.  To  avoid  moral  hazard,  deposit  insurance  premiums  should  be
risk-adjusted, the insurance  coverage  should be low, prompt corrective  actions should be
taken  against  banks,  and  early  intervention  should  take  place  in  weak  banks.  The
insurance  coverage  should aim at insuring the deposits of small depositors,  and should
exclude  part of large  deposits,  inter-bank  deposits,  government  deposits,  and  possibly
foreign-currency  deposits.  Low  coverage  may be  complemented  with  coinsurance  for
deposits larger than the smallest tranche of deposits.
The ultimate question on the pricing of deposit insurance in a particular country is
whether deposit insurance is priced correctly.  In section 3, we have investigated  whether
deposit  insurance  is  underpriced  in  countries  around  the  world  using  the  different
methodologies  presented  and  discussed  in section  1. We  find that the  actual premiums
levied on banks are lower than the premiums implied by these theoretical models in many
countries,  and argue that deposit  insurance  is underpriced in many countries  around the
world, notably in several developing countries.  These implied premiums also suggest that
many countries  cannot  afford deposit  insurance, in particular countries with weak banks
and institutions, as the estimated fair premiums imply contributions by the banks in these
55countries  that  would  be  unreasonably  high.  It  follows  that  countries  with  weak
institutions  should not adopt explicit deposit insurance.
Deposit  insurance may not be a  good recipe  for each  country,  but for countries
that do decide  to adopt deposit insurance,  pricing  it as efficient  as possible is important.
This means that prices should be set such that they reflect the risk shifted to the deposit
insurer.  In  order  to  facilitate  the  efficient  pricing  of risk,  banks  should  be  given  the
incentives  to  reveal  the necessary  information to  assess their risk.  In  an effort  to price
deposit insurance  more fairly and to give better incentives to banks,  many countries  are
considering  the  introduction  of risk-based  insurance  premiums.  We  have  argued  that
when banks have private information concerning  the quality of the bank's assets, it may
be difficult to achieve such an incentive-compatible  outcome.
The success of a deposit  insurance will depend  critically on the well-functioning
of other components of the safety net of a country,  such as lender-of-last-resort  facilities,
regulatory  norms, supervisory policies  and practices,  intervention  rules,  and insolvency-
resolution  policies  and  mechanisms.  The  well-ftmctioning  of  these  components  is
interdependent.  Therefore,  each of these components  should not be designed  separately,
but should be looked upon in conjunction.
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60Annex  Design features of existing deposit insurance schemes
This  table  presents  several  design  features  for  all  existing  Explicit  deposit  insurance  schemes  as of end-year  2000.  Panel A  presents  information  regarding
membership,  administration and funding of deposit insurance by country.  Panel B presents  information regarding the coverage  of the scheme.  Panel C presents
information  regarding  the pricing of deposit  insurance.  Since  2000,  the  introduction  of deposit  insurance  has  been planned  or is. under  consideration  in the
following  countries:  Albania,  Bolivia,  China,  Costa Rica,  Hong Kong,  Kuwait,  Russia,  and Zambia.  Data on the  features of the  deposit insurance  scheme  of
individual countries come from Garcia (2000) and Demirgiui-Kunt  and Sobaci (2001).  Data on the share of deposits covered in Brazil  is from Beck (2001). n.a.
indicates 'not available'.
Panel A  Membership, Administration and Funding
Country  Date Enacted/Revised  Membership  Administration  Permanent Fund  Source of Funding  Fund Target  Actual Fund
Compulsory=1  Official=1  Funded=l  Private=0  % of insured deposits  % of insured deposits
Voluntary=0  Joint=2  Unfunded=O  Joint--
Private=3  Public=2
Argentina  1979/1995  1  3  1  1  12.50%  0.25%
Austria  1979/1996  1  3  0  1  n.a.  n.a.
Bahamas  1999  1  1  1  1  no  n.a.
Bahrain  1993  1  2  0  0  n.a.  n.a.
Bangladesh  1984/2000  1  1  1  1  n.a.  0.4%
Belgium  1974/1995  1  2  1  1  0.50%  0.25%
Brazil  1974/1981/1995  1  3  1  0  5.00%  n.a.
Bulgaria  1998  1  2  1  1  14.29%  n.a.
Cameroon  1999  0  2  1  1  n.a.  n.a.
Canada  1967/1995  1  1  1  1  no  0.19%
Central Afr. Rep.  1999  0  2  1  1  n.a.  n.a.
Chad  1999  0  2  1  1  n.a.  n.a.
Chile  1986  1  1  0  2  no  n.a.
Colombia  1985  1  1  1  0  n.a.  11.70%
Congo, Rep. of  1999  0  2  1  1  n.a.  n.a.
Croatia  1997/1999  1  2  1  1  5.00%  0.85%
Czech Rep.  1994  1  1  1  1  n.a.  n.a.
Denmark  1988/1998  1  3  1  1  n.a.  n.a.
Dominican Rep.  1962/1999  0  2  1  1  n.a.  n.a.
61Country  Date Enacted/Revised  Membership  Administration  Permanent Fund  Source of Funding  Fund Target  Actual Fund
Cornpulsory=l  Official=l  Funded=1  Private=0  % of insured deposits  % of insured deposits
Voluntary=0  JointP2  Unfunded=0  Joint--l
Private=3  Public=2
Ecuador  1998  1  1  1  1  50.00%  n.a.
El Salvador  1991/2000  1  1  1  1  n.a.  n.a.
Eq.  Guinea  1999  0  2  1  1  n.a.  n.a.
Estonia  1998  1  2  1  1  3.00%  n.a.
Finland  1969/1992/1998  1  3  1  1  2.00%  0.14%
France  1980/1995/1999  1  3  1  0  n.a.  n.a.
Gabon  1999  0  2  1  1  n.a.  n.a.
Germany  1966/1976/1998  1  3  1  0  3% of loans  3% of loans
Gibraltar  1998  1  2  0  0  no  n.a.
Greece  1993/1995  1  2  1  1  no  n.a.
Guatemala  1999  1  1  1  1  10.00%  n.a.
Honduras  1999/2000  1  1  1  1  5.00%  n.a.
Hungary  1993  1  2  1  1  1.50%  1.00%
Iceland  1985/1996/2000  1  1  1  0  n.a.  n.a.
India  1961  1  1  1  1  2.0%  0.7%
Indonesia  1998  Not applicable  Not applicable  Not applicable  Not applicable  Not applicable  Not applicable
Ireland  1989/1995  1  1  1  0  n.a.  n.a.
Italy  1987/1996/1999  1  3  0  1  0.4%-0.8%  0.65%
Jamaica  1998  1  1  1  1  1.00%  n.a.
Japan  1971  1  1  1  1  no  deficit
Kazakhstan  1999  n.a.  2  1  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Kenya  1985  1  1  1  1  20.0%  5.3%
Korea  1996  1  1  1  1  n.a.  n.a.
Latvia  1998  1  1  1  1  no  n.a.
Lebanon  1967/1991  1  2  1  1  n.a.  n.a.
Lithuania  1996  1  1  1  1  n.a.  5.68%
Luxembourg  1989/1999  1  3  0  0  n a.  n.a.
62Country  Date Enacted/Revised  Membership  Administration  Permanent Fund  Source of Funding  Fund Target  Actual Fund Compulsory-=l  Official=1  Funded=1  Private=0  % of insured deposits  % of insured deposits Voluntary=0  Joint-2  Unfunded=0  Joint=l
Private=3  Public=2 Macedonia  1996/1997/1998/2000  1  3  1  1  5.00%  3.00% Mexico  1986/1990/1999  1  1  1  1  no  0.11% Morocco  1993/1996  1  1  1  0  no  n.a. Netherlands  1979/1995  1  1  0  I  n.a.  n.a. Nigeria  1988/1989  1  1  1  1  no  n.a. Norway  1961/1997  1  3  1  1  n.a.  n.a. Oman  1995  1  1  1  1  n.a.  n.a. Peru  1992/1999  1  2  1  1  n.a.  n.a. Philippines  1963  1  1  1  1  n.a.  n.a. Poland  1995  1  2  1  1  n.a.  1.80% Portugal  1992/1995  1  1  1  1  n.a.  n.a. Rornania  1996  1  2  1  1  n.a.  1.80% Slovak Rep.  1996  1  2  1  1  1.50%  0.47% Spain  1977/1996  1  .2  1  1  1.67%  n.a. SriLanka  1987  0  1  1  1  n.a.  n.a. Sweden  1996  1  1  1  1  n.a.  n.a. Switzerland  1984/1993  0  3  0  0  n.a.  n.a. Taiwan  1985/1995/1999  1  1  1  1  5.0%  0.3% Tanzania  1994  1  3  1  1  25.0%  22.5% Thailand  1997  Not applicable  Not applicable  Not applicable  Not applicable  Not applicable  Not applicable Trinidad & Tob.  1986  1  1  1  1  no  n.a. Turkey  1983  1  1  1  1  no  5.00% Uganda  1994  1  1  1  1  no  n.a. Ukraine  1998  1  1  1  1  n.a.  10.00% United Kingdom  1982/1995  1  1  0  0  n.a.  n.a. United States  1934/1991  1  1  1  1  1.25%  1.40% Venezuela  1985  1  1  1  1  n.a.  n.a.
63Panel B  Coverage
Foreign  Inter-Bank  Coverage  Coverage to  % of the number of deposit  % of the value of deposits
Country  Currencies  Deposits  Linilts  per capita GDP  Co-insurance  accounts covered  covered
yes=l; no=0  yes=l; no=O  US$  %  yes=l; no=0
Argentina  I  0  $30,000  3.9  0  95  40
Austria  I  0  $21,600  0.9  1  n a.  na.
Bahamas  I  1  $50,000  3.1  0  95  11.5
Bahrain  1  0  $5,640  0.7  1  na.  na.
Bangladesh  0  0  $2,020  5.5  0  96  31
Belgium  I  0  $21,600  1.0  0  na.  na.
Brazil  1  0  $17,070  4.9  0  98  43
Bulgaria  I  0  $2,297  1.6  1  n.a.  <35
Cameroon  0  1  $5,336  9.3  0  n.a.  na.
Canada  0  1  $40,790  1.8  0  87.5  35.9
Central Afr. Rep.  0  1  $3,557  13.3  0  na.  n.a.
Chad  0  1  $3,557  19.4  0  na.  n.a.
Chile  I  0  unlimited'  n.a.  1  94  9
Colombia  0  1  $7,500  3.8  1  98  34
Congo, Rep. of  0  1  $3,557  3.9  0  n.a.  n.a.
Croatia  1  0  $13,700  3.2  0  95  68
CzechRep.  0  0  $11,620  2.4  1  na.  na.
Denmark  1  0  $43,470  1.4  0  n.a.  <50
Dominican Rep.  I  0  $12,280  5.3  1  n.a.  n.a.
Ecuador  I  1  $3,250  3.0  0  n.a.  n.a.
El Salvador  1  0  $6,280  3.0  0  n.a.  n.a.
Eq. Guinea  0  1  $3,557  2.8  0  n.a.  n.a.
Estonia  I  0  $1,210  0.3  1  na.  1
Finland  1  0  $27,270  1.2  0  96  40
France  1  0  $66,670  3.1  0  87.5  n.a.
Gabon  0  1  $5,336  1.3  0  n.a.  n.a.
64Foreign  Inter-Bank  Coverage  Coverage to  % of the number of deposit  % of the value of deposits
Country  Currencies  Deposits  Limits  per capita GDP  Co-insurance  accounts covered  covered
yes=l; no=0  yes=l; no=0  US$  %  yes=l; no=0
Germany  1  0  $21,600  0.9  1  n.a.  na.
Gibraltar  1  n.a.  $21,600  n.a.  1  n.a.  n.a.
Greece  1  0  $21,600  2.0  0  n.a.  n.a.
Guatemala  0  1  $2,800  1.7  0  92.5  n.a.
Honduras  1  0  $7,000  7.7  0  n.a.  n.a.
Hungary  1  0  $4,498  1.0  0  97  48
Iceland  1  0  $21,600  0.7  0  n.a.  n.a.
India  1  0  $2,300  4.9  0  98  72
Indonesia  1  1  unlimited  unlimited  0  100  100
Ireland  1  0  $21,600  0.9  1  n.a.  n.a.
Italy  1  0  $111,240  6.0  1  na.  62
Jamaica  1  0  $5,000  1.9  0  90  33.5
Japan  0  0  unlimited  unlimited  0  100  100
Kazakhstan  1  0  n.a.  n.a.  1  n.a.  n.a.
Kenya  1  1  $1,390  4.0  0  83.3  16
Korea  0  0  unlimnited  unlimited  0  100  100
Latvia  1  0  $870  0.3  0  94.7  18.7
Lebanon  0  1  $3,320  0.9  0  n.a.  n.a.
Lithuania  1  0  $11,250  3.7  1  98.8  44
Luxembourg  1  0  $21,600  0.5  1  n.a.  n.a.
Macedonia  1  0  $5,550  3.4  1  100  99
Mexico  1  0  unlirnited  unlimited  0  100  100
Morocco  1  1  $5,090  4.4  0  n.a.  n.a.
Netherlands  1  0  $21,600  0.9  0  n.a.  n.a.
Nigeria  0  1  $140  0.4  0  78  21
Norway  1  0  $253,520  7.6  0  99.8  76.1
Oman  1  0  $52,080  8.8  1  n.a.  n.a.
Peru  1  0  $17,770  8.5  0  n.a.  n.a.
Philippines  1  1  $2,490  2.5  0  n.a.  n.a.
65Foreign  Inter-Bank  Coverage  Coverage to  % of the number of deposit  % of the value of deposits
Country  Currencies  Deposits  Limits  per capita GDP  Co-insurance  accounts covered  covered
yes=l; no=0  yes=l; no=0  US$  %  yes=1; no=0
Poland  0  0  $11,880  2.9  1  n.a.  n.a.
Portugal  1  0  $21,600  2.1  1  n.a.  n.a.
Romania  1  0  $1,920  1.2  0  96  n.a.
Slovak Rep.  1  0  $6,790  1.9  0  n.a.  47
Spain  1  0  $21,600  1.5  0  94  60
Sri Lanka  0  0  $1,330  1.6  0  n.a.  n.a.
Sweden  1  0  $30,956  1.2  0  n.a.  n.a.
Switzerland  0  0  $19,600  0.6  0  n.a.  n.a.
Taiwan  0  0  $31,500  2.3  0  94  45
Tanzania  0  0  $310  1.1  0  54  12
Thailand  1  1  unlimited  unlimited  0  100  100
Trinidad & Tob.  0  0  $8,000  1.5  0  96.3  34.1
Turkey  1  0  unlimited  unlimited  0  100  100
Uganda  0  0  $1,890  6.7  0  95  26
Ukraine  0  0  $120  0.2  0  n.a.  19
United Kingdom  1  0  $33,333  1.4  1  70  n.a.
United States  1  1  $100,000  2.8  0  99  65.2
Venezuela  0  0  $6,330  1.3  0  n.a.  n.a.
Chile has unlimited coverage for demand deposits only. For savings deposits, the coverage limit is US$ 3,400.
66Panel C  Pricing  __
Country  Assessment Base  Annual Premiums  Risk-Adjusted  Basis for Adjusting Premiums
% of  assessment base  yes=l; no=O
Argentina  insured deposits  0.3 plus 0.36-0.72  1  CAMEL-like ratios and risk assets
Austria  insured deposits  pro rata, ex post  0  Not applicable
Bahamas  insured deposits  0.05  0  Not applicable
Bahrain  deposits  ex post  0  Not applicable
Bangladesh  deposits  0.005  0  Not applicable
Belgium  insured deposits  0.02 plus 0.04 if  necessary  0  Not applicable
Brazil  deposits  0.3 plus 0.15 extraordinary contibution  0  Not applicable
Bulgaria  insured deposits  0.5  0  Not applicable
Cameroon  deposits plus NPLs  0.15% of deposits + 0.5% of NPLs  I  Non-performing  loans
CAMEL-like  ratios, asset concentration,
regulatory rating and adherence to
Canada  insured deposits  0.04 to 0.33  1  standards
Central Afr. Rep. deposits plus NPLs  0.15%  of deposits + 0.5% of NPLs  I  Non-performing  loans
Chad  deposits plus NPLs  0.15% of deposits + 0.5% of NPLs  1  Non-performing loans
Chile  not applicable  not applicable  0  Not applicable
Colombia  insured deposits  risk-adjusted  I  Independent rating (is pending)
Congo, Rep. of  deposits plus NPLs  0.15% of deposits + 0.5% of  NPLs  I  Non-performing loans
Croatia  insured deposits  0.8  0  Determined by Central Bank
Czech Rep.  insured deposits  0.5 (savings banks 0.1)  0  Not applicable
Demnark  insured deposits  0.2 (maximum)  0  Not applicable
Dominican Rep.  deposits  0.1875  0  Not applicable
Ecuador  deposits  0.65 + risk-adjustment  1  Risk rating
El Salvador  deposits  0.1  (can be raised to 0.3) + risk-based  nark-up  I  sub-standard securities
Eq.  Guinea  deposits plus NPLs  0.15% of deposits + 0.5% of NPLs  1  Non-performing loans
Estonia  deposits  0.5 (maximum)  0  Not applicable
Finland  insured deposits  0.05 to 0.3  1  Solvency ratio
France  deposits plus 1/3 loans  risk-adjusted  I  CAMELlilke ratios
67Country  Assessment Base  Annual Premiums  Risk-Adjusted  Basis for Adjusting Premiums
% of  assessment base  yes=l; no=0
Gabon  deposits plus NPLs  0.15% of  deposits + 0.5% of NPLs  I  Non-performing  loans
Germany  insured deposits  0.008 (statutory scheme); 0-0.1  (private sector)  I  Risk category and length of membership
Gibraltar  insured deposits  Administrative expenses and ex post  0  Not applicable
Greece  deposits  decreasing by size: 0.0025 to 0.125  0  Not applicable
Guatemnala  insured deposits  1.0 + 0.5 when the fund falls below its target  0  Not applicable
Honduras  deposits  Not more than 0.25  0  Not applicable
Hungary  insured deposits  0.16-0.19 (decreasing by size) + risk-adjustment  1  Capital adequacy
Iceland  insured deposits  0.15  0  Not applicable
India  deposits  0.05  0  Not applicable
Indonesia  not applicable  not applicable  not applicable  Not applicable
Ireland  insured deposits  0.2  0  Not applicable
Italy  insured funds  ex post, adjusted for size and risk  I  CAMEL and maturity transformation
Jamaica  insured deposits  0.1  0  Not applicable
Japan  insured deposits  0.048 + 0.036  0  Not applicable
Kazakhstan  insured deposits  0.125-0.375  1  CAMEL-like ratios
Kenya  deposits  0.15  0  Not applicable
Korea  deposits  0.05  0  Not applicable
Latvia  insured deposits  0.3  0  Not applicable
Lebanon  credit accounts  0.05  0  Not applicable
Lithuania  insured deposits  1.0  0  Not applicable
Luxembourg  insured deposits  ex post to a maximum of 5%  of  capital  0  Not applicable
Macedonia  insured deposits  0.01-0.025  1  CAMEL-like ratios
deposits and other
Mexico  liabilities  0.4-0.8  1  Determined by ministry of finance
Morocco  Deposits  0.2  0  Not applicable
Netherlands  insured deposits  ex post to a maximum of 10% of capital  0  Not applicable
Nigeria  Deposits  0.9375  0  Not applicable
risk-weighted assets
Norway  and deposits  0.5 of  risk-weighted  assets and 0.15 of  deposits  I  Risk-weighted assets
Oman  Deposits  0.02, not to exceed 0.3  0  Not applicable
68Country  Assessment  Base  Annual Premiums  Risk-Adjusted  Basis  for Adjusting Premiums
% of assessment base  yes=l; no=O
Peru  insured deposits  0.65 plus risk-adjustment  1  Determined by supervisor
Philippines  Deposits  0.2  0  Not applicable
risk-weighted assets
Poland  and deposits  up to 0.4  1  Risk-weighted assets
Portugal  insured deposits  0.08 to 0.12  1  CAMEL-like ratios
Romania  insured deposits  0.3 to 0.6  1  CAMEL-like ratios
Slovak Rep.  insured deposits  0.1 to 0.3  0  Not applicable
Spain  insured deposits  0.1  (maximum of 0.2)  0  Not applicable
Sri Lanka  Deposits  0.15  0  Not applicable
Sweden  insured deposits  0.5 (maximum)  1  Capital adequacy
gross earnings and
Switzerland  balance  sheet items  ex post, on demand,  varies  1  Earnings and some discretion
Taiwan  insured deposits  0.05-0.06  1  CAR and early warning system
Tanzania  deposits  0.1  0  Not applicable
Thailand  not applicable  not applicable  Not applicable  Not applicable
Trinidad & Tob.  deposits  0.2  0  Not applicable
Turkey  insured savings deposits 1.0-1.2  1  Capital adequacy
Uganda  Deposits  0.2  0  Not applicable
Ukraine  total deposits  0.5 plus special charges  0  Not applicable
United Kingdom  insured deposits  on demand, not to exceed 0.3  0  Not applicable
United States  domestic  deposits  0.00-0.27  1  CAMEL-like  ratios
Venezuela  insured deposits  2.0  0  Not applicable
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